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This dissertation comprises three chapters on health economics, which analyses the 
existing problems in Georgia's healthcare system and offers specific 
recommendations for policy makers.  
The first chapter, “Household Catastrophic Health Expenditure in Georgia and its 
Policy Implication” is a single authored paper. The main purpose of the 
aforementioned paper is to identify the factors affecting the prevalence of 
catastrophic healthcare expenditures (CHE) in Georgia and to evaluate the Fairness 
in Financial Contribution index (FFC) for the fourth quarter of 2015. By using the 
Integrated Household Survey Database of the National Statistics Office of Georgia, 
the research predicts the probability of occurrences of catastrophic health 
expenditure via the Logistic Regression Model and methodology developed by Xu 
(2005). According to the results, in 2015, the FFC index equaled 0.82 illustrating 
that it had been worsening since 2007 (when the FFC index equaled 0.72). Existing 
deterioration may be explained by the launch of the Universal Health Coverage 
program, introduced in 2013, offering similar insurance packages both to poor and 
rich households. The quintile for the poor, 3.5%, is more likely to face catastrophic 
health expenditures, compared to the higher income quintile groups, while the 
main factors causing catastrophic health expenditure are the costs associated with 
the chronically ill, and inpatient and outpatient treatments. To improve the fairness 
of the Georgian healthcare system, this research suggests focusing on segments of 
the poor population by expanding the size of their healthcare package.  
The second chapter, “Moving towards a Universal Health Coverage System: 
Lessons from Georgia and its Policy Implications” is the main paper of the 
dissertation. Which studies the effects of Expanded Medical Assistance for Poor 
(EMAP) and the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) programs in Georgia on 
healthcare utilization rates and the financial burden of the population. In 2012, the 
Georgian government expanded its existing program, Medical Assistance for the 
Poor (MAP), by including pensioners, children under five and students. In 2013, 
Georgia subsequently moved to the UHC program from targeted healthcare 
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insurance schemes. Since the initial implementation of the government’s initiative 
there has been no research assessing the impact of EMAP or UHC. Before 2012, 
the main recommendations of the existing research analyzing Georgia’s healthcare 
system was to focus on the most impoverished part of society and improve their 
insurance packages. Despite this, Georgia introduced UHC in 2013, instead of 
directing additional funds to vulnerable groups- offering better services, including 
medicinal benefits. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the relevance of 
the decision of the Georgian government to move toward UHC in 2013 by 
comparing the effects of EMAP and UHC. Based on integrated data from the 
National Statistics Office of Georgia and using difference in difference (DID) with 
a matching methodology, this study reveals that EMAP had a positive effect in 
terms of utilization rates, but had no effect on the financial burden of participant 
households.  
In 2012-2013 there was a 6% increase in inpatient and outpatient utilization rates. 
While, in evaluating the pure effect of UHC, there were no statistically significant 
changes in terms of healthcare service utilization or the financial burden on 
households without pensioners, children under five or students. The main 
recommendation for policy-makers is to target its budgetary resources on the most 
vulnerable part of society and to cover only catastrophic health expenditures for 
other households in need. Furthermore, it is recommended that pharmaceutical 
benefits be included in insurance packages, as it is currently the main out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenditure (OOPHE).   
The third chapter, “Analyzing the Composition of Catastrophic Health 
Expenditures in Georgia (2012-2015)”, is also a single authored paper. The main 
purpose of the study is to identify the composition of OOPHE which cause 
catastrophic health expenditure and to measure the incidence and intensities of 
catastrophic payments in 2012 and 2015 through the World Bank Methodology. 
By using the Integrated Household Survey from the National Statistics Office of 
Georgia’s database, the study illustrates that pharmaceutical costs have a 
significant share in OOPHE. Moreover, medication appears to be the chief cause of 
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household catastrophic health expenditures, as a vast 72% of CHEs are 
prescription related expenses. 
Furthermore, those households suffering with chronically diseased or disabled 
members spend 79% of their OOPHE on medicine, herewith the extent of 
pharmaceutical costs of OOPHE for the poor quintile is 84.7%: 16.1% greater than 
the rich quintile. The situation is comparable for outpatient treatments, where the 
proportion of medicinal expenses in OOPHE is 44%. In the case of poor 
households’, the share amounts to 57%, which is 21.3% over the rich quintile. An 
analysis of these incidences illustrates that the poorest quintile group’s catastrophic 
expenditures accounted for 16.6% in 2015, while it was 13.2% in 2012. Though, 
the fraction of money spent by households belonging to said quintile does not 
experience significant changes. Accordingly, as pharmaceutical costs cover such 
an extent, this policy paper offers its recommendations to the provision of 
whichever prescription benefits packages shall be the primary policy objective for 
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The main purpose of the present research is to identify the factors affecting the prevalence of 
catastrophic healthcare expenditure in Georgia and to find the Fairness in Financial Contribution 
index (FFC) for the fourth quarter of 2015. By using the Integrated Household Survey Database 
of the National Statistics Office of Georgia, the present research predicts the probability of 
occurrences of the catastrophic health expenditure via the methodology and the Logistic 
Regression Model developed by Xu (2005). The results reveal that, in 2015, the FFC index 
equaled 0.82, illustrating that it had been worsening since 2007 (when the index equaled 0.72). 
The deterioration may be explained by the launch of the UHC program, introduced in 2013, 
which offered comparable insurance packages both to poor and rich households, without a means 
testing approaches. The poor quintile is 3.5% more likely to face catastrophic health 
expenditures compared to the higher income quintile groups, while the main factors causing 
catastrophic health expenditure are costs associated with the chronically ill, and inpatient and 
outpatient treatments. To improve fairness within Georgia’s healthcare system, this present 
research suggests focusing on the population’s poorest members by expanding the size of their 




Fairness in financial contribution is determined by WHO (2000) as an intrinsic goal of 
health systems. Fairness in financial contribution and the protection against financial risk is 
based on the notion that every household should pay a fair share of their health costs. The FFC 
index reflects the overall inequality in households’ financial contributions into the health system. 
According to Xu’s (2005) highly discussed paper, health policy makers have long been 
concerned with protecting people from the possibility that ill health will lead to catastrophic 
financial payments and subsequent impoverishment. 
The Fairness in Financial Contribution index measures whether a country collects 
contributions from households to finance health in an equitable manner (WHO, 2000), which 
notably is a common and developing problem within the process of designing and implementing 
healthcare systems of low and lower middle income countries like Georgia (Zoidze et al., 2012). 
Gotsadze et al. (2009) measured an FFC index for Georgia equating to 0.82, showing that 
Georgia, in 2007, had a relatively fair healthcare financing system compared to equivalent 
country peer groups.  
Alongside measuring the FFC index, the necessity of determining the factors for 
catastrophic household health expenditures in Georgia were further discussed within Gotsadze’s 
et al. (2009) paper. The Research has identified Georgia as having one of the most unprotected 
healthcare financing systems, along with other transitional countries (Azerbaijan, Ukraine, 
Vietnam and Cambodia) which feature a similarly high rate. To reduce catastrophic health 
expenditures, Gotsadze’s et al. (2009) research suggested a greater focus on poor segment of the 
population by expanding government financed benefits for the poor and chronically ill, 
including, and broadening, inpatient coverage and implementing medication benefits. The focus 
on priority groups, and specifically on the poor, is a common feature of health financing reforms 
in other low and middle-income countries, including Cambodia (Leemput et al., 2007), China 
(Meessen, 2008), Indonesia (ILO, 2004), Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam (Jowett et al., 2007),  
and Tunisia (Arfa & Achouri, 2008). 
In 2007, the Georgian healthcare system provided assistance to the poorest sections of the 
society. Gotsadze’s et al. (2009) and Zoidze’s et al. (2012) papers measure the FFC index in 
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Georgia and analyze influences on catastrophic health expenditures. However, in 2013, the 
Georgian government launched the Universal Health Coverage program, since then, there has 
been no pertinent research determining either the FFC index in Georgia, its alternation, or 
identifying the factors that affect occurrences of catastrophic expenditure. The present research 
paper is aimed at analyzing the main factors triggering catastrophic health expenditures and at 
providing the necessary recommendations for policy makers for its reduction. 
The study considers the following questions: 1. What are the main factors affecting 
occurrences of catastrophic healthcare expenditure at the end of 2015? And, showing whether 
these factors have changed since the previous research, conducted in 2007; 2. Did the FFC 
index change between 2007-2015? To answer these questions, the present study uses the 
Integrated Household Survey Databases of the National Statistics Office of Georgia. Utilizing 
the distribution of health payments and the catastrophic expenditures methodology developed by 
Xu (2005), alongside the Logistic Regression Model, it is possible to predict the probability of 
the frequency of catastrophic health expenditure. 
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the data and the 
specification of the methodology. Section 3 presents the results of the research. While, section 4 
discusses policy implications and offers a conclusion.  
1.2. Data Description and Methodology Specification  
This study uses the Integrated Household Survey Databases of the National Statistical 
Office of Georgia from the fourth quarter of 2015. The data includes the average monthly 
expenditure, OPP health expenditure, geographical variables, and the socio-economic 
characteristics of each household, such as age, gender, and education. The total number of 
observations is 2746: where each household remains in the sample for one year, and four 
interviews are conducted during this period. As the survey only uses information from the fourth 
quarter of 2015, there is no reiteration of households in the database.  
In the process of the construction of the FFC index, the present study uses the equivalent 
size of the household, which is directly created by the National Statistics Office of Georgia. This 
variable is calculated for each household. The indicator depends on the sex and age of household 
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members. There are six groups based on sex and age, each of which have corresponding weights: 
Children (aged 0-7) with coefficient 0.64; Adults (aged 8-15); Working age males (aged 16-64) 
with coefficient 1; Working age females (aged 16-59) with coefficient 0.84; Pension age males 
(aged 65 and over) with coefficient 0.88; and Pension age females (aged 60 and over) with 
coefficient 0.76. The corresponding coefficients are assigned to every household member and 
then calculated for each household. 
The number of equivalent adults with scale (cohabitation) effect is calculated for each 
household. Indicators are calculated on the base of -0.6 coefficients. Scale (cohabitation) effect 
signifies that the expenditures of two households with one member is greater than the 
expenditure of one household with two members, because certain types of expenditures (rent, 
utility payments, etc.) are common for all household members. In the case of a single member 
household, the indicator does not change and is equal to the number of equivalent adults, while 
in all other cases, the indicator is equal to the number of equivalent adults to the power of 0.6.  
With regard to health variables, the data identifies households with a chronically sick or 
disabled member. This is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the household has a chronically sick or 
disabled member and 0 otherwise. The data also includes utilization variables such as: inpatient 
and outpatient variables that are identified subsequent to a National Statistics Office survey 
question. The following question was asked: did any member of the household use inpatient or 
outpatient services within the last three months? This dummy variable equals 1 if the household 
had used these services and to 0 otherwise. The present study also utilizes expenditure variables 
that measure both total expenditure and health expenditure of a household.  
In 2013, the Georgian health system experienced significant changes by transitioning to 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) from a targeted healthcare program, which provided 
governmental support to the poor and targeted groups such as children aged (0-5), elderly people, 
students, children with disabilities and persons with extreme disabilities. Under this health 
system, these targeted groups held a basic insurance package provided by the government.  
In 2013, by moving to UHC, the government of Georgia realized its 2012 pre-election 
promise: “Free Insurance for all”, however there were no significant changes to the insurance 
packages. It is noteworthy that in 2013 the UHC program pilot version was lunched, which 
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covered several parts of Georgia. While by the end of 2013, the UHC program was wholly 
implemented and fully functional. Therefore, using data from 2013 to identify factors affecting 
occurrences of catastrophic expenditure would be irrelevant. Equally, data from 2014 would be 
insufficient for the study, as at the time, awareness of the program was relatively low in Georgia. 
Hence the study selected the latest available data, the fourth quarter of 2015, to identify the main 
factors behind catastrophic health expenditures. 
Fairness in Financial Contribution  
To estimate catastrophic health expenditures and measure the FFC index, this research 
uses the methodology developed by Xu (2005). The main notion behind FFC is that every 
household should pay their fair share, with fairness equating to greater contributions from those 
households with larger financial resources. Xu (2005) develops methods to measure catastrophic 
health expenditure and identifies how to construct all necessary variables to measure the FFC 
index.  
To construct the FFC index, one needs to observe the following variables: 1. Household 
out-of-pocket heath expenditure (𝑂𝑂𝑃ℎ) 2. Household total expenditure (𝑒𝑥𝑝ℎ) and 3. Food 
Expenditure ( 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ) , which is the money spent on food items by a household, though 
expenditure on alcoholic beverages and tobacco are excluded. 
Different types of methodologies exist to define the poverty line, and all of them have 
their own limitations, this study uses the food shared poverty line which is recommended by Xu 
(2005). This poverty line (pl) is defined as the food expenditure of a household whose food 
budget share is at the 50th percentile in the country. In order to minimize measurement errors, 
this paper uses the average food expenditures of households whose food share of total 
expenditure is within the 45th and 55th percentile of the total sample. Considering the scale 
economy of household consumption, the household equivalence scale is used (a household’s 
equivalent size is defined by the National Statistics Office of Georgia). 
𝑝𝑙 =
∑ 𝑊ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑞𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ
𝑊ℎ
, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑45 < 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝ℎ < 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑55 
where 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑝ℎ  is a household’s food expenditure share of the total expenditure; 𝑊ℎ  is the 







where 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ is the household food expenditure, while 𝑒𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒ℎ is the equivalent household size.
1 
By using the poverty line, one can construct the subsistence expenditure for each household 
which is the poverty line multiplied by the equivalent size of household: 
𝑠𝑒ℎ = 𝑝𝑙 ∗ 𝑒𝑞𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒ℎ. 
Using 𝑠𝑒ℎ, one can define a household’s capacity to pay, which is a household’s non-subsistence 
spending. When food expenditure is less than the substance of spending, it is possible to define 
the capacity to pay (cpt) as the difference between total expenditure and food expenditure. When 
food expenditure is more than the substance of spending, the capacity to pay will be the 
difference between total expenditure and the substance of spending: 
𝑐𝑡𝑝ℎ = {
𝑒𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑠𝑒ℎ   𝑖𝑓    𝑠𝑒ℎ ≤ 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ,
𝑒𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ   𝑖𝑓    𝑠𝑒ℎ > 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑ℎ .
 
Finally, using a household’s capacity to pay one can generate the main variable, which is used to 





The distribution of households’ financial contributions across households has been 
summarized using the Fairness of Financial Contribution (FFC). This index is designed to weight 
heavily those households that have spent a very large share of their beyond subsistence effective 
income on health. The index thus reflects overall inequality in household financial contribution 
into the health system, and particularly reflects those households facing catastrophic health 
expenditure. The FFC is based on the mean of the cubed absolute difference between the oopctp 
a given household and the oopctp norm. The index is of the form: 
𝐹𝐹𝐶 = 1 − √







                                                          







The FFC ranges between 0 and 1. The FFC index is close to 1 if each household’s 
OOPHE share of a household’s capacity to pay is close to the norm of OOPHE share of a 
household’s capacity to pay. Thus, the average household’s OOPHE (no matter which quintile 
group) is the same. When the FFC index is close to 1, it shows that a country has a fair financial 
system, because households’ OOPHE are more or less the same. 
The Logistic Regression Model 
In order to define the factors which cause catastrophic health expenditures, scholars 
commonly use the Logistic Regression Model (Akbar et al, 2015, Puteh & Almualm, 2017, Xu et 
al., 2003). In this research the Logistic Regression Model will help to find the factors that lead 
the population to catastrophic expenses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if catastrophic expenditure occurs and 0 otherwise.  
The Logistic Regression Model’s independent variables are those that one can define in 
the data charter: 1. a chronically sick or disabled member of a household (dummy variable); 2. 
the last inpatient service utilization used by any member of a household during the previous three 
months (dummy variable); 3. the last outpatient service utilization used by any member of a 
household during the previous three months (dummy variable); 4. household composition and 
demography; and 5. the expenditure quintile groups.2 To compare households with different 
economic statuses, the expenditure quintile groups were defined as the share of total expenditure 
divided by the equivalent size of a family and then ranked from the poorest to richest.3 
Catastrophic Health Expenditures 
Catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) refers to any disbursement for medical treatment 
that pose a threat to a household’s financial ability to maintain its subsistence needs. According 
to the World Health Report (2000), one of the fundamental functions of a health system is to 
protect a population from the financial risks associated with ill health, quantified in terms of 
catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment from medical expenses. According to WHO 
                                                          
2 The lowest quintile is used for the reference group. 
3 The expenditure quintile groups were defined through ranking household monthly expenditure per adult 
equivalent (dividing households’ monthly expenditure by adult equivalent household size). 
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(2010), about 150 million people face catastrophic expenditure as a consequence of high out-of-
pocket expenditure (OOP) for healthcare each year. 
As stated by Kimani & Maina (2015), two common approaches are used to measure 
catastrophic health expenditure (CHE). The first, proposed by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003), 
is related to budget share. The second, by Xu (2005), is related to a household’s capacity to pay. 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer defined OOP as catastrophic if they exceed certain fraction of a 
household’s total expenditure or income in a given period. Whereas, Xu (2005) defined 
catastrophic health expenditure in relation to a household’s non-food expenditure.  
While the popular approach defines medical spending as “catastrophic” if it exceeds a 
fraction of a household’s income or total expenditure in a given period. For instance, WHO 
(2005) indicates that health expenditure is considered catastrophic whenever it is equal to or 
exceeding 40% of a household’s non-subsistence income. Subsistence need is defined as the 
minimum requirement for a household to maintain basic needs within society.4 
Within research related to CHE and the functioning of health systems, both approaches 
are used to define CHE. In their studies Daneshkohan et al. (2011), Puteh & Almualm (2017), 
Kien et al. (2016), and Mchenga et al. (2017) define health expenditures as catastrophic if the 
out-of-pocket health expenditure is greater than 40% of a household’s non-subsistence (non-
food) expenditure.  
While other scholars such as Dorjdagva et al. (2016), O’Donnell et al. (2005), Ranson 
(2002), Nabila (2016), and Tolla et al. (2017), classify catastrophic health expenditure as annual 
out-of-pocket payments above 10% of a household’s total expenditure/income.  
As the aim of the present research is to estimate the FFC index in Georgia and factors 
causing the population’s CHE, it is notable that both of the studies on Georgia, with the same 
objectives, conducted by Gotsadze et al. (2009) and Zoidze et al. (2012), define health 
expenditures as catastrophic if the OOP is greater than 40% of household’s non-food 
expenditure.  
                                                          
4 The basic life needs are food, shelter, clothing and certain household goods. A household’s non-
subsistence income is the remaining money after their basic needs have been met. 
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Besides which, O’Donnell et al. (2008) notes that health spending is income elastic, 
hence non-food expenditure may be preferred to better detect catastrophic payments among the 
poor. Finally, in accordance with WHO’s (2005) definition and the studies previously conducted 
in Georgia, the present research will also assess the expenditure as catastrophic if out-of-pocket 
health expenditure is over 40% of a household’s non-food expenditure.  
1.3. Results 
The main objective of the present papers is to define the factors causing the population’s 
catastrophic health expenditures. Variables such as utilization, geographic location, or having a 
chronically ill or disabled person in the household increase the probability of occurrences of 
catastrophic health expenditure. The number of households including the chronically ill or the 
disabled is very high in Georgia. Around 57% of households have at least one member with 
serious health conditions. According to the results of the present research, OOPs are significantly 
higher for the majority of households in the survey, regardless of whether they rank among the 
rich or poor quintile groups (Table 1.1). For instance, in the poor quintile, 96% of the 
expenditures incurred for the medical treatment of the chronically ill or disabled are paid by their 
households, similarly households from the rich quintile pay 95% of the same incurred 
expenditures.  
Households from the poor quintile spend 34 GEL for the medical treatments of 
chronically ill or disabled members of the family, while their total expenditures are 229 GEL. 
Regarding the wealthiest quintile, the expenditures incurred for the medical treatment of 
chronically ill members of the household accounts to 79 GEL, out of their total healthcare 
expenditure 1536 GEL (Table 1.2). Therefore, the financial pressure incurred for the medical 
treatment of a household with chronically ill or disabled members is higher in the poor quintile 
compared to the rich quintile.  
A similar picture holds for outpatient treatment. Regardless of the economic condition of 
the household (rich or poor), OOP expenditures are around 89% of OOP outpatient health 
expenditure share of the total outpatient health expenditure (Table 1.1). Poor households spend 
20 GEL on outpatient treatments (their total expenditure accounts to 229 GEL), while the rich 
quintiles’ spending incurred for outpatient treatment is 70 GEL (and their total expenditures, 
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1536 GEL). These findings illustrate that as with chronic illnesses, outpatient treatments may 
also be a significant reason for catastrophic health expenditures for the poor, more so than the 
rich.  
While with inpatient treatment, 68% of expenditure incurred for treatment comes from 
OOP of poor households, which is 22% less in comparison with the expenditures incurred by the 
rich quintile (Table 1.1). Specifically, the figures reveal that inpatient treatment expenditures for 
the poor quintile are 59 GEL (from a total expenditure of 229 GEL), whereas the same spending 
for the rich quintile amounts to 305 GEL (from the total 1536 GEL). The results illustrate that 
expenditures for inpatient treatment incurred by poor households relatively are higher in 
comparison to rich households. 
Furthermore, the figures, provided in Table 1.3, reinforce the judgment, which highlights 
that 28% of poor households incur CHE, while only 10% of the rich quintile face catastrophic 
health spending. 
It is also noteworthy that hospitals are more accessible in urban than in rural regions, 
thus, the demographic variable is significant to help illustrate the related differences in CHEs. In 
rural areas, 28% of households face CHE, while in urban areas it is only 18%. The difference 
between urban and rural CHE is statistically significant in the 99% CI interval (Table 1.4). 
Each of the above-mentioned variables were used as independent variables and can 
influence the occurrence of CHE. Therefore, this study has run the OLS and Logistic Regression 
Model.  
In both the OLS and Logistic Regression Models all the variables, except the urban 
variable, are statistically significant in the 95% CI (Table 1.5). Households which have members 
with a chronic illness or disabilities are 10% more expected to face CHE in comparison with 
other households. In addition, households who had outpatient treatment are 4.4% more likely to 
face catastrophic expenditure, compared to those who never utilized outpatient treatments. 
Furthermore, households whose members had inpatient treatment are 16.75% more likely to have 
catastrophic health expenditure, compared to households who did not use inpatient treatments. 
In regard to the quintile groups, the richest quintile suffers 3.2% less risk of having 
catastrophic expenditure in comparison to the poor group. Likewise, the 3rd and 4th quintiles 
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suffer around 3.5% less risk in comparison to the poor quintile. Finally, rural areas suffer 5% 
more catastrophic risk compared to the capital city.  
An analysis of two papers, the present work alongside Gotsadze’s et al. (2009), illustrates 
that in 2007-2015 there were the same variables affecting the prevalence of catastrophic 
expenditures of the population. This research has discerned that the FFC index in 2015 equals -
0.72, which is worse than the FFC index in 2007 (-0.82). A decrease in the FFC index identifies 
that the health financing system, from 2007, had become less fair by 2015.   
1.4.  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
The present research highlights specific recommendations to decrease incidences of 
catastrophic health expenditure. The focus on the poor population will help the Georgian 
government attain positive outcomes from the UHC program. According to this research the 
health system policies should be oriented on the following: 1. more attention should be paid to 
the poorest segment of the population. The size and the coverage of their insurance package 
should be increased. The aforementioned recommendation is based on the evidence that both 
during inpatient and outpatient treatment the poor quintile face more catastrophic health 
expenditure than the rich (Table 1.1 and 1.2). 2. The UHC package has a lack of pharmaceutical 
benefits for its beneficiaries, significantly increasing the occurrence of CHE for households. 
Therefore, the existing healthcare package should be improved through the inclusion of 
prescription medication for the poor. 3. Households in the rich quintile still face CHE, 
specifically, 1 out of 10 household is under the risk of catastrophic health expenditures (Table 
1.3), hence, instead of a basic health coverage package, the government should introduce only 
coverage for catastrophic health expenditures.  
The fact that the FFC index in Georgia worsened between 2007-2015 may be explained 
by the launch of the UHC program, introduced in 2013, which offers similar insurance packages 
both to poor and rich households. These policy recommendations may carry relevance for policy 
makers from other low and middle-income countries facing similar problems of high OOP and 















Poorest   
Fifth  
2 3 4 
Richest 
Fifth  
% of total population with chronically 
diseased or disabled family member 
57 1580 55 63 59.16 55 51 
  
OOP Chronic Health Expenditure share 
to Total Chronic Health Expenditure 
96 
 
97 97 97 97 95 
% of total HH's with acute sickness during 
last 3 month (Outpatient) 
31 863 25 29 31 31 37 
 
OOP Outpatient Health Expenditure 




89 90 91 87 87 
% of total HH's with Stationary Treatment 
during Last 3 Month (Inpatient) 
4 92 1 2 4 3 9 
  
OOP Inpatient Health Expenditure share 
to Total Inpatient Health Expenditure  
53 
 
68 63 65 49 46 
% reported to be Beneficiaries of State 
Program for Population below the Poverty 
Line 11 274 
 
 
23 14 11 3 1 
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Table 1.2. HH’s Monthly Expenditure Characteristics Mean in GEL (99 % CI) 
 
Table 1.3. Percentage of HH's by Quintile Groups, Facing Different Levels of Health 
Expenditure at Different Cut-off Points (99% CI for Cut-off Points) 
 
 
Note: The table shows that 18% of households are facing catastrophic health expenditure. Catastrophic health 
expenditure is defined by a household’s expenditure over 40% than their capacity to pay. The poor quintile faces a 
catastrophic health expenditure of 27%, which is 17% more than the rich quintile face. This indicates inequality 






















Poorest 229 34 20 59 13 
2 386 47 26 73 13 
3 533 58 32 118 12 
4 737 76 49 86 11 
Richest 1536 79 64 305 10 
Total 684 58 40 195 12 
  Poorest 2 3 4 Richest  Total 
OOP >= 40 % of CPT 27 23 19 12 10 18 
OOP = 20-40 % of CPT 22 24 20 18 10 19 
OOP = 10-20 % of CPT 11 16 17 15 15 15 
OOP = 0-10 % of CPT 40 37 44 55 64 48 
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Table 1.4. Percentage of HH's by Region Groups, Facing Catastrophic Health Expenditure 







Table 1.5. Estimated Coefficients in the OLS and Logistic Model for Catastrophic Health 
Care Expenditure (HH's data) 
 
 
 Region Total 
Urban OOP >= 40 % of CPT 18 
Rural OOP >= 40 % of CPT 28 
Tbilisi  OOP >= 40 % of CPT 19 
  
OLS Model Logistic Model Margins, dy/dx 
Coefficients P > |t| Coefficents P > |t| dy/dx P > |t| 
Intercept 0.007 0.600 -5.157 0.000     
Chronic 0.0695 0.000 2.028 0.000 0.1055 0.000 
Outpatient 0.0386 0.000 0.852 0.000 0.044 0.000 
Inpatient 0.4206 0.000 3.219 0.000 0.1675 0.000 
Poorest Quintile (Reference Group) 
      
 
2nd Quintile -0.0339 0.012 -0.338 0.239 -0.017 0.242 
 
3rd Quintile -0.0399 0.003 -0.7498 0.011 -0.039 0.014 
 
4th Quintile -0.0271 0.045 -0.658 0.037 -0.034 0.040 
 
Richest Quintile -0.0394 0.004 -0.621 0.051 -0.032 0.056 
Capital city, Tbilisi (Reference Group) 
      
 
Urban Area (not includes Tbilisi) 0.0004 0.970 0.7108 0.059 0.037 0.067 
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Towards Universal Health Coverage system: Lessons 
Learnt from Georgia and its Policy Implications 
(Main Paper) 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of Expanded Medical Assistance for the Poor (EMAP) and 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) programs in Georgia on healthcare utilization rates and the financial 
burden of the population. In 2012, the Georgian government expanded its existing program of Medical 
Assistance for the Poor by adding pensioners, children under five and students. In 2013, Georgia 
transitioned to the UHC program from targeted healthcare insurance schemes. Since the initial 
implementation of the government’s initiative, there has been no research assessing the impact of either 
EMAP or UHC. Prior to 2012, the main recommendations of the prevailing research analyzing Georgia’s 
healthcare system was to focus on the section of society in the greatest need and to improve their 
insurance packages. Despite this, Georgia introduced UHC in 2013, rather than directing additional funds 
to vulnerable groups- namely, offering better services and including prescription benefits. The main 
objective of this paper is to evaluate the relevance of the decision of the government of Georgia to move 
toward UHC in 2013 by comparing the effects of EMAP and UHC. Based on data from the National 
Statistics Office of Georgia and using difference in difference with a matching methodology, this study 
reveals that EMAP had a positive effect in terms of utilization rates, but it had no impact on the financial 
burden of participant households. Between 2012-2013, there was a 6% increase in inpatient and 7% 
increase in outpatient utilization rates. When evaluating the pure effects of UHC there were no 
statistically significant changes in terms of healthcare services utilization and financial burden on 
households without pensioners, children under five or students. Furthermore, this paper is encouraging for 
researchers working on cross-sectional data using a difference in difference (DID) approach due to the 
methodology. Cross-sectional data creates econometric problems, such as the differences in control and 
treatment groups on a set of baseline characteristics. The study’s assessment of UHC and EMAP is 
performed using four grouping propensity score matching (PSM) with a DID method, which offers less 




2.1 Introduction  
The primary goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC), introduced in Georgia in 2013, on the utilization of health services and expenditures. 
This paper further seeks to evaluate the targeted health reforms of the Expanded Medical 
Assistance for the Poor (EMAP), introduced in 2012. The investigation provides a better 
informed decision-making process for policy makers determining whether to insure the entire 
population with basic health packages or to develop targeted insurance packages for the most 
vulnerable households. Despite the significant influence of healthcare systems on the wellbeing 
of households, there has been no research conducted in Georgia on the effects of transitioning to 
UHC. The empirical findings of this study will benefit Georgian policy makers as they proceed 
to the next stages of UHC reform. The subsequent findings may also be utilized as a guide for 
designing an effective transitional path towards Universal Health Coverage in countries similar 
to Georgia, which plan to implement universal healthcare reform. 
The policy makers expected UHC and EMAP to improve the population’s financial 
protection and consumption of health services. This research, however, does not support their 
expectations either in terms of financial protection, either with UHC or EMAP. Nevertheless, 
EMAP, which covers households with pensioner, students and children, has had a greater 
positive effect on the utilization of health services. The combined results of UHC and EMAP 
also reveal a positive effect on both outpatient and inpatient visits for the households which were 
covered by EMAP.   
Furthermore, this paper is encouraging for researchers working on cross-sectional data 
using a difference in difference (DID) approach due to the methodology. Cross-sectional data 
creates econometric problems, such as the differences in control and treatment groups on a set of 
baseline characteristics.  
The study’s assessment of UHC and EMAP is performed using four grouping propensity 
score matching (PSM) with a DID method, which offers less biased results in the cross-sectional 
data. In addition to this approach, the empirical analysis also employs the standard PSM with 
DID and the simple DID methods. When comparing the three methods, the four grouping 
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method appears to be the most valuable under statistical point of view for analyzing cross-
sectional data.   
In this paper, access to health services is evaluated by the inpatient and outpatient 
utilization rates, while financial protection is measured by individual households’ out-of-pocket 
health expenditure (OOPHE), and catastrophic health expenditures (CHE) using various 
thresholds.  
This research looks at the following two questions: 1. What impact did the EMAP and 
UHC programs have on the ratio of OOPHE to capacity to pay between 2012-2015? 2. What 
impact did the EMAP and UHC programs have on inpatient and outpatient utilization rates in 
2012-2015? To answer these research questions, the paper uses the Integrated Household Survey 
Database of the National Statistics Office of Georgia. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 1 reviews the existing literature and Georgia’s 
previous healthcare system; section 2 focuses on the data and methodology; section 3 presents 
the results of the research; and section 4 discusses the policy implications and provides the 
conclusions. 
2.2 An Analysis of the Existing Research 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the core aim of UHC is to provide 
quality, essential health services to a population, without their being exposed to financial 
hardship. Numerous countries, at all levels of development, are embracing UHC to achieve a 
higher level of welfare for their citizens. UHC is also a decisive component within the United 
Nations’ 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which outlines the following 
specific health goals: to ensure financial risk protection, access to quality healthcare services and 
to affordable essential medication (WHO & World Bank Group, 2015). 
According to the World Bank Group and WHO’s joint global monitoring report on 
Universal Health Coverage, health programs should be measured using three significant facets: 
1. who is covered; 2. which services are covered; and 3. the proportion of costs that are covered 
by who? (Figure 2.1). Ultimately, UHC should be implemented, such as individuals and 
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households are protected from “financial ruin” due to healthcare costs (McIntyre & Kutzin, 
2016). 
In impact evaluation literature, there are different approaches for examining the effects of 
healthcare reforms. The impact of Mexico’s “Seguro Popular (SP)” program on financial 
protection was examined by Galarraga et al. (2009) and King et al. (2009) by using both OOPHE 
and CHE variables. In each paper, a household’s healthcare spending exceeding 30% of their 
total capacity to pay indicated catastrophic healthcare expenditure. Another approach may be to 
consider health expenditure catastrophic whenever it equals or exceeds 40% of a household’s 
non-subsistence income. Where subsistence need is defined as the minimum requirement for a 
household to maintain a basic standard of living. In their studies, Puteh & Almualm (2017), Kien 
et al. (2017), and Mchenga et al. (2017) each define health expenditure as catastrophic if the out-
of-pocket healthcare expenditure is more than 40% of a household’s non-subsistence (non-food 
related) expenditure. This paper will evaluate catastrophic expenditure using both the 30% and 
40% thresholds.  
Wagstaff et al. (2007) used inpatient and outpatient utilization variables to measure the 
impacts of the insurance program on access to health services in China. Trujillo et al. (2005) 
used the same variables to evaluate experiences in Colombia. These studies measure inpatient 
and outpatient utilization of health services via the following questions: was an individual 
hospitalized in the 12 months prior to the interview, and did an individual use outpatient care 30 
days prior to the interview. This study differs slightly, as it uses data on inpatient and outpatient 
utilization over the three months prior to the day of the interview. Whilst the dummy variables 
are: the last inpatient service used by any member of a household over the last three months; and 
the last outpatient service used by any member of a household over the last three months. 
The variables of the outcomes are based on how researchers evaluate healthcare reforms. 
This investigation evaluates reforms based on: 1. inpatient and outpatient utilization of health 
services, and 2. CHE at 30% and 40% thresholds, and on OOPHE.   
2.2.1 The Georgian Experience 
In accordance with WHO Guidelines on Healthcare Programs, since 2006, the Georgian 
government has been developing its own social and healthcare system. The Georgian healthcare 
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system has experienced diverse, large-scale reforms within this short period. Crucially, the 
system was adapted several times between 2006 and 2013, with the transformation of services, 
insurance coverage, financial protection methods and the scope of funding.  
In 2006, the Georgian government launched an essential social policy, in which it 
established the Social Service Agency (SSA) to identify poor people based on a scoring and 
proxy means testing system. This scheme was based on each household’s welfare index. The 
lower the welfare index, the lower the welfare of the household. The SSA evaluated each 
applicant (household) based on the information collected from their SSA survey. In order to 
become recipients of MAP, households must first be registered in the SSA database and then 
assigned a score of 70,000 or less, via the SSA survey (Table 2.3).5 The proxy means test uses 
over 80 variables to determine each household’s welfare status. The main groups of variables are 
the following: the different types of properties owned; income; utility expenses; level of 
education; household size; and geographical location. There were no Georgian regions excluded 
from the program, with the exception of occupied territories. Different weights were applied to 
the variables depending on each regions’ development level. Similar proxy means tests have 
been implemented in other middle-income countries including Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Colombia, Russia, and Egypt (Coady et al., 2004). 
In 2007, the Georgian government launched the Medical Assistance for the Poor (MAP) 
program, which was based on principles similar to the various health financing reforms in other 
low and middle-income countries like Tunisia (Arfa & Achouri, 2008), Mexico (Coady et al., 
2004), and the Philippines (Jowett & Hsiao, 2007). MAP was focused on the poorest segments of 
the population, identified by the SSA, and offered coverage for urgent outpatient and inpatient 
treatments. From 2007 to 2012, minor changes were made to Georgian healthcare programs, and 
in May 2012, the government further expanded the program to include both children under the 
age of six and the retired (EMAP), who were previously ineligible as recipients of MAP. Thus, 
EMAP offered coverage to households identified by the SSA, in addition to all pensioners, 
children under the age of six and to students. After these modifications to MAP, approximately 
50% of the total population was covered (Zoidze et al., 2012). Finally, in the third quarter of 
2013, the UHC program was introduced to cover the entire population. While, between 2011 and 
                                                          
5 There were 481,505 registered households, with households scoring below 100,000 obtaining social assistance 
and those below 70,000 receiving medical assistance from the government. 
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2015, no significant changes were introduced to the insurance packages offered to the 
households identified by the SSA (Table 2.5). 
A few notable research papers have provided an in-depth analysis and assessment of the 
reforms conducted between 2007 and 2012. For instance, a study by Gotsadze et al. (2009) made 
recommendations to the Georgian government to focus on the financial protection of the poor, 
and to extend the benefits for the poor and the chronically ill by including and expanding 
inpatient coverage and with co-payments for medication. Pharmaceutical expenditure was found 
to be one of the main causes of impoverishment, thus adding a co-payment mechanism for 
medicine would improve the financial protection of the poorest households.  
An additional piece of research by Zoidze et al. (2012), using data from 2007-2010, 
found that MAP had a positive impact in reducing expenditure for inpatient services and 
households’ total healthcare costs. However, MAP insurance had almost no effect on health 
services utilization or on household’s expenditure on outpatient medication. Analyzing the 
effects of MAP, Zoidze et al. (2012) further recommended the inclusion of additional co-
payments for medication. 
The general trends of this study’s variables are also noteworthy in the outcome of 
outpatient and inpatient visits, and CHE and OOP for the population: for instance, statistics from 
the Ministry of Health show an increase in outpatient utilization. From 2012 to 2015, individual 
average outpatient visits to hospitals increased by 1.3 visits per person. There is a similar trend 
for inpatient health services, which increased by 4253 for every 100,000. This research will 
further evaluate whether these increases were stimulated by UHC and EMAP. In terms of OOP, 
the WHO statistics identify that OOPHE per capita in Georgia increased by only 4% from 2012 
to 2014, and decreased by 14.1% from 2014 to 2015. This contradicts UNICEFs research on 
OOP, which shows an increase of 31% from 2013 to 2015 (UNICEF, 2013 & 2015). These 
statistics do not show whether this change is due to UHC or to other factors. This research 




2.3 Data  
The data is derived from the Integrated Household Survey of the National Statistics 
Office of Georgia, conducted in the first quarters of 2011-2015. The data is cross-sectional, and 
each household remains in the sample for one year and is interviewed four times during that 
period. Because the UHC program does not cover individuals with private insurance, to avoid 
compromising the results, households where at least one member is the beneficiary of private 
insurance are removed from the sample. The sample size for each year is shown in Table 2.4. 
The majority of these observations, 15.6%, were withdrawn due to private insurance in 2013, and 
the least, 9.6%, in 2015.   
In 2011, the National Statistics Office of Georgia included a new variable in the survey 
concerning insurance types. This variable provides information regarding the type of insurance 
for each member of a household, including state insurance, insurance at an employer’s expense 
or at an individual’s expense. The absence of this variable before 2011 limited the opportunity to 
study how insurance packages have changed over time. Due to this data limitation, it is not 
possible to create control or treatment groups prior to 2011.  
The data includes the following general information about households: size, the number 
of children and pensioners in a family, and geographical characteristics (living in urban or rural 
regions). The data also reports household monthly expenditure, such as healthcare costs, food 
expenditure, etc. It also includes subjective evaluations of each household’s financial conditions, 
based on living conditions. In order to avoid the effects of inflation on expenditure variables, 
they have been adjusted to 2011 prices. General inflation statistics have been taken from the 
National Statistics Office of Georgia. While, the first three months of each year have been 
adjusted to the corresponding months of 2011 (Table 2.2). 
Tables 2.7-2.11 report the baseline descriptive statistics for the characteristics and the 
outcomes studied within the control and treatment groups. Treatment group 1 has the highest 
level of education and comfort of living. As this group does not include pensioners or children, 
their need for healthcare services and their OOPHE is the lowest. The control group was created 
mostly from poor households, and therefore their standard of living is the lowest among the three 
groups. In 2011, around 70% of the control group lived in rural areas. In terms of the head of a 
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household’s educational level and comfort of living, their indicators are the lowest compared to 
the other groups.  
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Control and Treatment Groups 
The present study uses the following three different methods to estimate the impact of 
reforms: 1. DID with covariates; 2. DID with PSM and covariates; and 3. DID with four 
grouping PSM and covariates. These matching approaches alongside the DID method is 
increasingly common in the impact evaluation literature (Wagstaff et al, 2007, Shen & 
Zuckerman, 2005, & Stuart et al, 2014). The choice of the empirical approach has critical 
importance on the robustness of the results. This section will elaborate on the advantages and 
limitations of these various methods within the study. 
Households are classified as a “control” if they were insured by the MAP program before 
EMAP or UHC were introduced. The first treatment group includes households that do not 
belong to the control group and where there is neither a pensioner, a student nor a child aged 
below six. Meanwhile, all households that are not in the control group or in treatment group 1, 
are comprised of treatment group 2 (households in which members were covered under EMAP). 
Therefore, the control and treatment groups contain the entire population, excluding households 
with at least one member with private insurance. 
According to the Household Survey, around 19% of all households are in the control 
group (448 households). While, approximately 28% of households (690) are in treatment group 
1, and 53% (1302 households) are in treatment group 2 (Table 2.6). 
2.4.2 Limitations  
According to Stuart et al. (2014), there are two potential types of selection bias that are of 
concern to DID studies: across time and across groups. The former, selection bias across time, 
occurs when treatment groups and control groups change in composition over time. Therefore, 
the control group from the pre-treatment period differs from the control group of the post-
treatment period. Whereas, selection bias across groups occurs when treatment groups and 
control groups have different baseline characteristics, consequently they would be poor 
26 
 
counterfactuals to each other. Both types of bias are especially relevant when, firstly, the control 
and treatment groups are not selected randomly and, secondly, the analysis is based on cross-
sectional data.  
In the present study, the selection bias across groups is due to the control groups 
consisting of households with low income. In 2011, the independent variables, which are 
described in Table 2.1, are statistically different between the control groups and the treatment 
groups (Table 2.7). Furthermore, only 31% of the households in the control group were living in 
urban areas, while 58% of households in treatment group 1 and 49% of households in treatment 
group 2 resided in urban areas. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
indicates that control and treatment groups are different from each other (Tables 2.7-2.11).   
Selection bias across time is also substantial. For instance, treatment group 1, treatment 
group 2, and the control group all altered certain baseline characteristics over time, such as the 
comfort of living or whether a family had chronic member in family. In 2014, in treatment group 
1, a further 9% households had three or more facilities compared to 2011, and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Tables 2.12-2.15). 
2.4.3 Method 1 - DID with Covariates  
This method is a standard DID analysis- 
Y = β0 + β1T + β2S + β3(TxS) + β4X + ε 
where Y is the outcome of interest, T is the dummy variable equal to- 
T =
1 if year = post treatment period
0 if year = pre treatment period
 
and S represents the group where- 
 
S = {
1 if  group =  "Treatment group 1"
0 if group = "Control group"
 
or- 
                                     S = {
1 if  group = "𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2"




In this regression,  β1 measures the differences between the control group in the post-
treatment and pre-treatment periods.β2 captures the differences between the control group and 
the treatment groups in the pre-treatment period. Meanwhile, β3 measures the outcome of the 
DID.  
As previously mentioned, the characteristics of the control group and the treatment 
groups of this study differ both across groups as well as across time. Hence, the use of a standard 
DID methodology would result in biased estimations.  
2.4.4 Method 2 - DID with PSM and Covariates  
Propensity score matching was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). PSM is 
routinely used to mitigate selection biases across groups, and the use of this method is beneficial 
when a study uses cross-sectional data (Wagstaff et al., 2007, Stuart et al., 2014). Crucially, PSM 
is needed when baseline characteristics of a control group and treatment groups are different. In 
the present study, the control group and the treatment groups are statistically different from each 
other, and this method allows for the effect of these differences to be diminished. Several studies 
have relied on this solution using a DID method to evaluate insurance programs (Shen & 
Zuckerman, 2005, Wagstaff et al., 2007). For instance, Shen & Zuckerman (2005) evaluated 
Medicaid in the USA by considering program beneficiaries as a treatment group and privately 
insured individuals as a control group. Their study faced a problem as privately insured 
individuals have different characteristics, such as levels of income and education, when 
compared to the Medicaid program participants. PSM was chosen to mitigate such biases. For 
example, before their weighting, the control group included only 4% of poor households, while 
the treatment group contained 57%. After weighting however, the control group covered 56% of 
poor households. Wagstaff et al. (2007) also used PSM with DID to manage the selection bias 
caused by the voluntary nature of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) in China. 
Where participates enrolled voluntarily in the program, therefore selection was not random.   
The limitations of PSM are that it removes any bias caused by selection on observable 
variables, but there is the possibility of bias due to unobservable variables.  
The main weakness of this combined DID with PSM method is that it cannot solve the 
selection biases that exist across time. Weights, which are generated by PSM, bring the control 
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group and treatment groups closer in a given year. For example before matching, the difference 
between variable comfort for treatment group 2 in 2014 and 2015 was 4%, which was not 
statistically significant (Table 2.12). After PSM, the difference becomes 5% significant in 95% 
CI. The results, illustrated in Table 2.20, show that PSM did not solve the selection bias within 
groups across time.    
2.4.4 Method 3 - DID with Four Grouping PSM and Covariates  
The main method used in this study is a four grouping PSM, which mitigates limitation 
biases across time and across groups. The present study uses the method proposed by Stuart et al. 
(2014). The four grouping PSM in DID is the most appropriate for this research, as it provides 
unbiased estimators even when the data is cross-sectional and has both limitations. The key 
assumption for this method is that, group composition over time is not affected by the program 
of interest. A second key assumption is that, the trends across time are similar for control and 
treatment group. Furthermore, as with the PSM with DID method, four group PSM weighting 
does not account for unobserved characteristics that could lead to different trends. Utilizing the 
four group weighting strategy, the present study weighted four groups (pre-treatment, post-
treatment, pre-control, post-control) to make them similar, within a set of key observable 
characteristics. The propensity score is defined as the probability of households, considering 
their set of observable covariates that will fall into one of the four groups. For example, for each 
household, the present study calculates the probability of it being in the pre-treatment, post-
treatment, pre-control and the post-control groups. Independent variables chosen for calculating 
propensity score are presented in Table 2.1. Each household will have four resulting propensity 
scores, eg(Xi): the probability of being in group g, where g=1,2,3,4. Each of the four groups is 
weighted to be similar to group 1, which is the treatment group from the pre-treatment period. 
Hence, the study has four results for each household, and once weighted they receive one score. 
The following equation gives the weights for household i: 
                                                      𝑊i=e1(Xi)/e1(Xi). 
Here g shows to which the household truly belonged. Households from group 1 receive a 
weight of 1, while individuals in other groups receive a weight that is proportional to the 
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probability of their being in group 1, relative to the probability of being in the group they were 
truly in.   
Conducting the balance test, which elaborates when matching was successful, showed 
that the control group and treatment groups moved closer to each other. For example, in 2011, in 
treatment group 1 there were 27% more households living in urban areas compared to the control 
group before matching. After matching though, the difference was only 1% according to the 
PSM and 4% according to the four grouping PSM. There are five different sets of results with 
four grouping comparison of the control group and treatment groups over the different years. 
This was necessary for the study, as four grouping brings pre-treatment closer to the other three 
groups (see Tables 2.16-2.19). Also, the four grouping PSM have a positive impact on the 
problems associated with changes in group composition across time. For example, after the four 
grouping PSM, the differences between years for treatment group 2 in the chronic variable 
become almost zero, and the same is true for treatment group 1 (Table 2.21). 
When using a DID method, trend assumptions must be satisfied, thus the control group 
and treatment groups should follow the same trend before any reforms are implemented. Due to 
data limitations, as control groups could not be identified before 2011, the trends could also not 
be observed prior to 2011. UHC was implemented in the second quarter of 2013, therefore 
comparing control and treatment groups prior to UHC allows for trend assumptions to be tested, 
and thus it is possible to ascertain whether the control group and treatment groups had different 
trends prior to the reform. 
The targeted health reform EMAP took place in the second quarter of 2012, consequently 
trend assumptions could only be checked by comparing the first quarters of 2011 and 2012. 
Subsequently, the study is limited to observing only a few periods. Nevertheless, for all the 
dependent variables, in 2011 and 2012, the trend assumption is fulfilled when the comparing 
control and treatment group 2 (Tables 2.24 & 2.25). 
Comparing the control group and treatment group 1 using a standard DID with 
covariates, catastrophic healthcare expenditure, with a 30% threshold variable, was found to 
contradict trend assumptions in 2011-2013. A disadvantage of this method is that it allows for 
biased estimators, when the previously selection biases exist. After using PSM and the four 
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grouping PSM, all the results confirm the existence of similar trends between the control group 
and treatment groups (see Tables 2.22 & 2.23).  
2.5 Results and Discussion  
As MAP was expanded in the first quarter of 2013, a comparison of 2012 with 2013 
reveals EMAP’s effects on treatment group 2. The results from these years show no decrease or 
increase in the financial variables for treatment group 2, however there was a 6% increase in 
inpatient and 7% increase outpatient utilization (Tables 2.24 & 2.25). This reveals that insuring 
pensioners, children and students did not decrease the financial burden on their families, 
although it did increase their use of medical services.  
Between 2012-2013, for treatment group 2 CHE at the 40% threshold decreased by 1%, 
while at 30% they decreased by 2%. While in the control group CHE decreased by 1%, at the 
30% threshold and increased by 1% at the 40% threshold (Table 2.26). These numbers indicate 
that there was no significant change in CHE in 2012-2013 for either group. Our estimation also 
showed no statistically significance changes for these two variables (Table 2.24). The finding is 
further corroborated by previous research conducted on the MAP program. Recommendations 
from these studies shows the most significant factor was insufficient insurance packages. Their 
main recommendation was to add medication to the insurance package of MAP, as 60% of 
household health expenditure was spent on pharmaceuticals. When expanding MAP, this 
recommendation was disregarded, therefore in terms of financial variables, there were no 
significant improvements for households.   
On average, out-of-pocket health expenditure decreased by 3 GEL (approximately 1.2 US 
dollars) for the control group in 2012-2013. However, there was a 12 GEL (approximately 5 US 
dollars) increase for treatment 2 group (Table 2.26). The regression results showed that the 
reform had no effect on OOPHE (Table 2.24). The WHO statistics for Georgia also showed that 
OOPHE only increased by 2.7 international dollars. Therefore, one can conclude that in terms of 
the financial burden on the population, EMAP had no significant effect on treated households.   
Whereas in 2014, the UHC scheme was already in place, and all members of treatment 
group 2 had insurance. Therefore, comparing treatment group 2 from 2012 to 2014 offers an 
estimation for the joint effects of the UHC and EMAP programs.  
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From 2012 to 2014, the CHE for treatment group 2, for the 40% and 30% thresholds, 
decreased by 4% and 5% respectively. Whilst, the CHE for the control group experienced a 5% 
decrease at the 40% threshold, with 3% decrease for the 30% threshold (Table 2.27). The 
subsequent regression showed that the reform had no statistically significant effect on CHE for 
these years. There is also no improvement in terms of OOPHE (Table 2.24). UNICEF research in 
2013 and 2015 examined OOPHE for a given year, with prices normalized for 2009. Their 
statistics showed no decrease in OOPHE and confirmed that the financial burden for the 
population does not decrease. 
Nevertheless, EMAP had a positive effect on healthcare service utilization in 2012-2013. 
The statistics on healthcare services from the Ministry of Health shows the same trend, revealing 
individuals’ average use of outpatient services increased by 0.4 per person in 2012-2013. 
Furthermore, there was an increase in inpatient utilization of healthcare services by 711.3 for 
every 100,000 of the population. The regression results showed that there were 7% reform 
effects for outpatient and 6% for inpatient utilization of healthcare services (Table 2.25) 
The joint effect of EMAP and UHC increased inpatient utilization of healthcare services 
by 6% in 2012-2015 (Table 2.25). The Ministry of Health statistics reveal the same trend in 
improvement, with an increase from 9367.1 to 12,221 for every 100,000 people for inpatient 
healthcare services in 2012-2015.  
The analysis does not show any combined effect of the programs on outpatient visits 
when comparing 2012 to 2015 (Table 2.25). The Ministry of Health statistics on outpatient visits 
show there was a drastic increase from the individual average of 2.3 to 3.6 per person. This 
increase was primarily caused by the prescription medication reform in September 2014, which 
forced individuals to visit a doctor in order to obtain medicine. Prior to this reform, individuals 
could buy any medication without visiting a doctor. Thereafter pharmacies often hired doctors to 
prescribe a patient’s desired medication. In this research, the outpatient variables do not include 
such visits, therefore the study identifies a pure change of outpatient health services. In 2012-
2015 there was no statistically significant increase for outpatient health services utilization.   
The inpatient utilization rate may have increased simply because households could not 
afford inpatient care before insurance, and the government programs offered them the 
opportunity to receive healthcare services. Furthermore, the government’s inefficiency in 
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monitoring hospitals provided them incentives for manually increasing inpatient utilization, in 
order to receive additional governmental funding. This notion is supported by the fact that 
governmental spending on UHC dramatically increased over the three years, with expenditure 
building 15% each year from 2013 (Figure 2.2).   
Reviewing the EMAP program, one can see that insuring pensioners, children and 
students did not decrease the financial burden on their families, however it certainly increased 
their use of medical services. These results could imply that the expanded MAP allowed these 
families the opportunity to spend an equivalent amount of money on better healthcare. Moreover, 
as insurance did not cover medicine, the money families saved from the free medical services 
was consequently budgeted for medication. A further explanation for the increase in utilization 
relates to the moral hazards associated with insurance programs. Overall, the improved MAP had 
a positive impact on treatment group 2 in terms of utilization, yet if the aim of this program was 
to decrease the financial burden of healthcare, the insurance package still requires improvement 
and ought to include a co-payment mechanism for medication. 
EMAP did not cover any member of treatment 1 group, so the comparison of the control 
and the first treatment group reveals the effects of the UHC program. Despite the expectations, 
UHC showed no improvement in regards of OOPHE, CHE, inpatient or outpatient utilization 
rates for treatment. One could argue that treatment group 1 had less need for the program 
compared to the other groups, therefore insurance had less impact on their use of healthcare 
services. The descriptive statistics from Table 2.9 illustrate that treatment group 1 had less CHE 
and OOPHE compared to the control and the second treatment group. Ultimately, they were 
spending less money on healthcare and they were, in general, using fewer inpatient and 
outpatient healthcare services.  
In conclusion, EMAP and UHC had a mutually positive effect on households with 
pensioners and children, where inpatient and outpatient visits both increased. This research 
furthermore shows that EMAP and UHC had no significant effects on the financial protection of 
the population. Therefore, policy makers should take into account the recommendations made by 
other significant research and include co-payments for pharmaceuticals. This research has also 
led to the conclusion that a more targeted approach, like EMAP, which focuses on such 
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aforementioned vulnerable groups, could be a crucially effective tool for increasing the 
utilization rates of healthcare services. 
2.6 Conclusion  
This paper has reported findings on the impact of Universal Health Coverage and 
Expanded Medical Assistance for the Poor in Georgia, focusing on healthcare services utilization 
and the financial burden for the population. The impacts are estimated by combining difference-
in-differences and matching methods. The results reported three different methods: simple DID, 
PSM with DID and DID with four grouping PSM. Combining DID with a matching method is 
arguably the most effective way to deal with selection biases in estimating the impact of health 
insurance. This paper also shows that the four grouping PSM performs better compared to the 
other two methods for mitigating selection biases. 
The results suggest that EMAP had a positive impact on the utilization of healthcare 
services, but no effect on CHE or OOPHE. This resulted in treatment group 2 having a 6% 
increase in inpatient and 7% increase in outpatient utilization of healthcare services between 
2012-2013. While in 2012-2015, the combined effect of UHC and EMAP had a 6% increase in 
inpatient utilization of healthcare services (Table 2.25). This finding is not surprising and is 
consistent with the relevant studies in healthcare. Insurance programs are clearly associated with 
higher rates of utilization. Despite this, UHC had no impact on the rate of utilization of treatment 
group 1. This could be explained by the fact that households in this group do not have pensioners 
or children under five years old. Their rate of utilization was furthermore already the lowest 
among the control and treatment groups prior to UHC.  
The financial burden for the population was not affected by UHC or EMAP for either 
treatment group. This is consistent with the previous literature on Georgian insurance programs. 
Insurance programs do not include pharmaceutical benefits, even after the introduction of the 
UHC program. Previous researchers have concluded that pharmaceutical costs were one of main 
sources of financial burden for families, as they account for 60% of OOPHE. Nevertheless, 




 This paper’s results suggest that a more targeted approach, like EMAP, had a 
greater positive effect on the well-being of the population. Yet policy makers should still focus 
on vulnerable groups and increase their insurance package coverage, as pharmaceutical benefits 





Table 2.1 Variable Names and Definitions 
Independent Variables: 
1. Education - When the head of a household has a higher education or above it equals 1, 
otherwise 0. 
2. Urban - A geographical variable. Equals 1 if a HH lives in an urban area and equals 0 if a 
HH lives in a rural area.  
3. Chronic - If a HH has a chronically ill or disabled member it equals 1, otherwise 0.  
4. Living m2 - This variable shows how many m2 per member of a home. (For example, if a 
house is 100 m2 and 4 people live there, the variable equals 25 m2.)  
5. Comfort - A dummy variable, which equal 0 if a household has fewer than 3 ‘facilities’. And 
equals 1 if a HH’s has more. Facilities are the following: 1. Individual system of hot water. 
2. Electricity. 3. Central system of gas. 4. Liquid gas supply. 5. Individual heating system. 6. 
Land line phone 7. The internet.  
6. Size of HH’s - Size of a Household.  
7. Age 70 - A dummy variable and shows if household has a member with age over 70, equals 
1 if it had, otherwise 0. 
8. Quintiles - Total expenditure quintile groups. 
Dependent Variables: 
1. Cata 40 - Catastrophic health expenditure with a 40% threshold. 
2. Cata 30 - Catastrophic health expenditure with a 30% threshold. 
3. OOP_Health_Exp – Out-of-pocket health expenditure.  
4. Outpatient - The last outpatient visit by any member of a household during the last three 
months (dummy variable.) 
5. Inpatient - Inpatient utilization by any member of a household during the last three months 
(dummy variable.)  
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Figure 2.2 The Difference between Planned and Actual State Budget in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 
     
    2013 2014 2015 
Universal Public Health (Budget code: 35 03 01) 
Actual Expenditure 
69.916 338.471 573.620 
Planned Expenditure 
  200.000 470.000 
Difference Between Actual and Planned   
  138.471 103.620 
Population Healthcare (Budget code: 35 03) 
Actual Expenditure 
435.516 588.279 790.577 
Planned Expenditure 
  605.849 13.000 
Difference Between Actual and Planned   




Table 2.2 CPI - Adjusted Costs by Years (2011 is a reference year) 
 
 
Table 2.3 Distribution of Registered Households Across Different Score Groups 
 
 




2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III 
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 1.021 1.022 1.011 1.043 1.044 0.983 1.008 1.009 0.969 0.995 0.984 
  
No more 
than 57,000  










At least one member of HH 
has private insurance 
Percentage  
2011 2748 296 10.8 
2012 2855 367 12.9 
2013 2751 429 15.6 
2014 2800 290 10.4 
2015 2748 264 9.6 
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Table 2.5 Service Packet Coverage 









-Family or district doctor and nurse service, if necessary, at 
home services  
-Instrumental examination by a doctor 
-Clinical-laboratory examination by a doctor's prescription 
-Service of the family or village physician specialists  
-Necessary examination for disability status/excluding high-
tech examinations 
-For the examination of people with disabilities, in 
particular, an examination to obtain the status of disability, 
except for high-tech studies (computer tomography and 
nuclear-magnetic resonance studies) 
-Issuing of all types of medical information, conclusions and 
prescriptions (including reciprocating medication for 
incurable patients),  
except for the form №IV-100 
-Service of the family or village or district physician and 
nurses, including vaccination provided by the National 
Prophylactic Vaccination National Schedule  
-Health status and risk factor assessment, preventive 
measures, diagnosis and management of diseases, 
palliative care. 
-Outpatient services provided by physicians and 
specialists by the designation of the family, village or 
district doctor; 
-Any type of instrumental examination on the outpatient 
level by the doctor's prescription 
-Electrocardiograph, ultrasound and X-ray examinations 
(X-ray, radiography, mammography) 
-Clinical-laboratory studies on outpatient level at the 
outpatient level 
-Necessary examination for disability status/excluding 
high-tech examinations 
-For the social examination of persons with disabilities, 
in particular, an examination to obtain the status of 
disability, (computer tomography and nuclear-magnetic 
resonance studies) 
-Issuing of all types of medical information, conclusions 
and prescriptions (including reciprocating medication 
for incurable patients) 













-Including provision of specific serum and vaccine services 
purchased within the state healthcare programs 
-Emergency medical services and medical transportation 
-Services provided by the Emergency Brigade and in 
case of necessity - provide patient hospitalization by 
medical examination at the nearest relevant clinic  
-Handling referral cases of critical and urgent situations, 
consultation on the site of the referral brigade, 
stabilization of the condition, medical transportation of 













-Including infectious diseases and palliative care of 
incurable patients 
 
-Hospitalization related to complicated pregnancy, 
childbearing or lungs 
-Emergency hospital services, including infectious 
diseases and palliative care for incurable patients,  
-Hospitalization related to complicated pregnancy, 
childbirth 
-Emergency hospital services, including infectious 
diseases and pulse incurable patients   






The limit for a 







The limit for a 







-All types of laboratory and instrumental diagnosis carried 
out during the pre-operative, operation and post-operative 
periods related to planned surgical operations (including 
day-to-day hospital), including planned surgical 
hospitalizations 
-All types of laboratory and instrumental investigations 
carried out during the pre-operative, operation and post-
operative periods related to planned surgical operations  












Annual limit - 
15,000 GEL 





-Chemotherapy and radiation therapy, as well as research 
and medication related to these procedures 
 
-Chemotherapy and radiation therapy, as well as studies 
















-Physical Delivery -Physical Delivery Limit - 500 GEL Limit - 500 GEL 
-Caesarean -Caesarean Limit - 800 GEL Limit - 800 GEL 
Medicinal Benefits  
 
-According to the list of medicines -According to the list of medicines 50% - Co-funded 
Limit - 50 GEL 
50%- Co-funded 














    2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Control 
Group  
N. obs 445 499 494 442 414 
% of Total 18% 20% 21% 18% 17% 
Treatment 1 
N. obs 730 698 596 727 701 
% of Total 30% 28% 26% 29% 28% 
Treatment 2 
N. obs 1277 1291 1232 1341 1369 
% of Total 52% 52% 53% 53% 55% 
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Table 2.7 Illustration of Selection Bias in 2011/Characteristic Differences Between Groups  
  




















  mean se   mean se   mean se   
Independent variables 




























































































































Table 2.8 Illustration of Selection Bias in 2012/Characteristic Differences Between Groups 
 























  mean se   mean se   mean se   
Independent variables 




























































































































Table 2.9 Illustration of Selection Bias in 2013/Characteristic Differences Between Groups  
 














Difference between           
Control and 
Treatment 1 Groups 
Difference between  
Control and 
Treatment 2 Groups   mean se   mean se   mean se 
Independent variables 




























































































































Table 2.10 Illustration of Selection Bias in 2014/Characteristic Differences Between Groups  
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Independent variables 




























































































































Table 2.11 Illustration of Selection Bias in 2015/Characteristic Differences Between Groups  
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Table 2.12 Differences within Groups Across Time (Education, Family size, Comfort) 
 





Control Group Treatment 1 Group Treatment 2 Group  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Education 




   
  
2012 -0.04 
   
0.03 
  
  0.02 
  
  




  0.05 0.03 
 
  
2014 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 
 
0.07* 0.04 0.06   0.05* 0.03 0.00   
2015 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.10*** 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Family size 




   
  
2012 -0.08 
   
0.03 
  
  -0.06 
  
  




  0.03 0.09 
 
  
2014 -0.10 -0.02 0.14 
 
-0.05 -0.07 0.07   -0.08 -0.02 -0.11   
2015 -0.14 -0.05 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.02 
Comfort 




   
  
2012 -0.01 
   
0.05 
  
  -0.02 
  
  




  0.00 0.03 
 
  
2014 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 
0.09*** 0.04 0.10***   0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07***   




Table 2.13 Differences within Groups Across Time (Urban, Age70, chronic) 
 
*** Significance at 1 %.  ** Significance at 5% * Significance at 10%.     
  
 
Control Group Treatment 1 Group Treatment 2 Group  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Urban 
   
    
  





  -0.01 
  
  0.00 
  
  
2013 0.04 0.01 
 
  -0.04 -0.03 
 
  0.00 0.00 
 
  
2014 0.00 -0.03 -0.04   -0.04 -0.02 0.01   0.00 0.01 0.00   
2015 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
age70 
   
    
  





    
  
  0.03 
  
  
2013 -0.01 -0.01 
 
     
 
  -0.02 -0.06** 
 
  
2014 0.02 0.02 0.03         0.03 -0.01 0.05   
2015 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02   
  
  -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 
chronic                         
2012 0.03 
  
  -0.04 
  
  0.03 
  
  
2013 0.05 0.02 
 
  0.04 0.07* 
 
  0.06** 0.03 
 
  
2014 0.12*** 0.09** 0.07   0.01 0.05 -0.02   0.10*** 0.07*** 0.04   




Table 2.14 Differences within Groups Across Time (Quintile 1, 2, 3) 
 
 




Control Group Treatment 1 Group Treatment 2 Group  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
quintile_1   
  
    
  





  -0.01 
  
  -0.02 
  
  
2013 0.09* 0.00 
 
  0.00 0.01 
 
  -0.03 0.00 
 
  
2014 0.12*** 0.04 0.04   0.01 0.02 0.01   -0.04** -0.02 -0.01   
2015 0.09** 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
quintile_2             
2012 -0.04 
  
  -0.01 
  
  0.01 
  
  
2013 -0.06 -0.03 
 
  0.00 0.01 
 
  0.00 -0.01 
 
  
2014 -0.04 -0.01 0.02   -0.02 -0.01 -0.01   0.01 -0.01 0.00   
2015 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
quintile_3   
  
    
  





  -0.01 
  
  0.00 
  
  
2013 0.01 0.00 
 
  -0.02 -0.01 
 
  0.01 0.01 
 
  
2014 0.01 0.00 0.00   -0.03 -0.02 -0.01   0.01 0.01 0.00   




Table 2.15 Differences within Groups Across Time (Quintile 4, 5) 
 
 







Control Group Treatment 1 Group Treatment 2 Group  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
quintile_4                         
2012 -0.03 
  
  0.02 
  
  -0.02 
  
  
2013 -0.02 0.01 
 
  0.02 0.00 
 
  -0.01 0.01 
 
  
2014 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01   0.01 -0.01 -0.01   0.00 0.01 0.00   
2015 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
quintile_5   
  
    
  





  0.01 
  
  0.03 
  
  
2013 -0.01 0.02 
 
  0.01 0.00 
 
  0.02 0.00 
 
  
2014 -0.05** -0.02 -0.04   0.03 0.02 0.02   0.03 0.00 0.00   
2015 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
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with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2011 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2012 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2013 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2014 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2015 
 Year diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value Diff P-value diff P-value 
  Education -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.89     0.02 0.64 0.02 0.67         
  Comfort -0.28 0.00 -0.03 0.41     -0.05 0.24 -0.06 0.17         
  Urban -0.27 0.00 -0.01 0.60     -0.04 0.42 -0.04 0.39         
2011 Chronic 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.78     0.01 0.76 0.02 0.54         
  Quintile1 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.39     0.04 0.17 0.04 0.17         
  Quintile2 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.79     0.02 0.55 0.03 0.30         
  Quintile3 -0.02 0.46 0.01 0.88     0.01 0.82 0.01 0.84         
  Quintile4 -0.02 0.27 -0.01 0.59     -0.03 0.29 -0.03 0.23         
  Quintile5 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.36     -0.04 0.25 -0.05 0.15         
  Education -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.88 -0.02 0.66     -0.01 0.78 -0.01 0.78 -0.02 0.73 
  Comfort -0.34 0.00 -0.01 0.77 -0.05 0.31     -0.05 0.37 -0.05 0.34 -0.06 0.26 
  Urban -0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.18 -0.08 0.05     -0.11 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.01 
2012 Chronic 0.32 0.00 -0.01 0.90 0.02 0.73     0.01 0.72 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.85 
  Quintile1 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.02 0.39     0.03 0.33 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.34 
  Quintile2 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.84 0.01 0.74     0.01 0.59 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.64 
  Quintile3 0.01 0.68 0.00 0.92 -0.01 0.64     -0.01 0.70 -0.02 0.57 -0.01 0.80 
  Quintile4 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.99     -0.02 0.69 -0.01 0.81 0.00 0.99 
  Quintile5 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.67     -0.02 0.72 -0.02 0.68 -0.04 0.51 
  Education -0.24 0.00 -0.01 0.84 -0.01 0.81 -0.01 0.79     0.00 0.89 -0.01 0.81 
  Comfort -0.28 0.00 -0.02 0.53 -0.04 0.37 -0.04 0.43     -0.03 0.34 -0.04 0.30 
  Urban -0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.47 -0.05 0.22 -0.07 0.11     -0.06 0.18 -0.07 0.11 
2013 Chronic 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.64 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.48     0.03 0.30 0.02 0.50 
  Quintile1 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.26     0.02 0.41 0.02 0.37 
  Quintile2 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.67 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.51     0.03 0.26 0.03 0.39 
  Quintile3 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.63 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.59     0.00 0.83 0.01 0.67 
  Quintile4 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.59     0.01 0.76 0.02 0.53 




Table 2.17 Balance Test for Treatment Group 1  
 
  Year Covariates 
Before matching 
After matching with 
PSM 
After matching with  
4Grouping PSM - 2012 
After matching with  
4Grouping PSM - 2013 
diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value 
  Education -0.34 0.00 -0.06 0.11 -0.13 0.01 -0.09 0.04 
  Comfort -0.38 0.00 -0.05 0.23 -0.10 0.09 -0.09 0.06 
  Urban -0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.19 -0.08 0.13 -0.07 0.11 
2014 Chronic 0.36 0.00 0.03 0.45 0.03 0.45 0.05 0.27 
  Quintile1 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.41 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.04 
  Quintile2 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.01 0.67 0.02 0.52 
  Quintile3 0.02 0.37 -0.01 0.76 -0.02 0.54 -0.01 0.74 
  Quintile4 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.81 -0.03 0.55 -0.02 0.52 
  Quintile5 -0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.32 -0.06 0.25 
  Education -0.18 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.18 
  Comfort -0.34 0.00 0.05 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.13 
  Urban -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.05 0.36 0.04 0.41 
2015 Chronic 0.32 0.00 -0.05 0.25 -0.04 0.19 -0.02 0.52 
  Quintile1 0.16 0.00 -0.03 0.40 -0.04 0.23 -0.03 0.37 
  Quintile2 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.59 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.47 
  Quintile3 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.76 
  Quintile4 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.86 -0.01 0.92 -0.02 0.59 
  Quintile5 -0.15 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.28 
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with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2011 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2012 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2013 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2014 
After matching 
with  4Grouping 
PSM - 2015 
  diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value Diff P-value diff P-value 
  Education -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.37 
  
-0.04 0.26 
        Family size -0.65 0.00 0.06 0.69 
  
0.13 0.47 
        Comfort -0.28 0.00 -0.02 0.55 
  
-0.03 0.51 
        Urban -0.18 0.00 0.02 0.69 
  
0.00 0.82 
      2011 age70 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.51 
  
-0.03 0.40 
       chronic -0.01 0.72 0.04 0.32   0.04 0.21       
  Quintile1 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.58 
  
0.01 0.58 
        Quintile2 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.50 
  
0.03 0.31 
        Quintile3 -0.01 0.73 -0.01 0.78 
  
-0.01 0.76 
        Quintile4 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.53 
  
-0.02 0.64 
        Quintile5 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.82 
  
-0.02 0.63 
        Education -0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.55 -0.03 0.49 
  
-0.03 0.39 -0.03 0.38 -0.04 0.27 
  Family size -0.68 0.00 -0.22 0.07 -0.37 0.01 
  
-0.33 0.02 -0.32 0.02 -0.33 0.02 
  Comfort -0.27 0.00 -0.03 0.34 -0.04 0.28 
  
-0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.09 
2012 Urban -0.14 0.00 0.02 0.63 0.05 0.19 
  
0.03 0.34 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.13 
  age70 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.22 -0.06 0.09 
  
-0.05 0.10 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.07 
 chronic 0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.64 -0.02 0.62   -0.02 0.62 -0.02 0.55 -0.01 0.69 
  Quintile1 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.55 
  
0.02 0.52 0.01 0.73 0.02 0.50 
  Quintile2 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.03 0.25 
  
0.04 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.24 
  Quintile3 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.92 
  
0.00 0.99 0.01 0.79 0.01 0.80 
  Quintile4 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.88 -0.02 0.61 
  
-0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.76 -0.01 0.74 
  Quintile5 -0.20 0.00 -0.02 0.40 -0.02 0.55 
  
-0.03 0.34 -0.04 0.31 -0.04 0.28 
  Education -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.98   0.01 0.86 
        Family size -0.93 0.00 -0.11 0.37   -0.18 0.22 
        Comfort -0.30 0.00 -0.01 0.82   -0.01 0.92 
        Urban -0.13 0.00 0.02 0.51   0.03 0.42 
      2013 age70 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.45   -0.03 0.46 
       chronic 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.77   0.02 0.60       
  Quintile1 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.77   0.01 0.61 
        Quintile2 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.95   0.00 0.84 
        Quintile3 -0.01 0.73 0.00 0.88   0.00 0.89 
        Quintile4 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.99   0.01 0.78 
        Quintile5 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.90   -0.01 0.78 





















 Year Covariates 
Before matching After matching with PSM 
After matching with  
4Grouping PSM - 2012 
  diff P-value diff P-value diff P-value 
  Education -0.20 0.00 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.11 
  Family size -0.68 0.00 -0.07 0.74 0.01 0.99 
  Comfort -0.37 0.00 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.16 
  Urban -0.18 0.00 0.02 0.52 0.04 0.37 
2014 Age70 0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.03 
 chronic 0.03 0.23 0.01 0.85 0.01 0.98 
  Quintile1 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.36 
  Quintile2 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.43 
  Quintile3 -0.01 0.60 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.96 
  Quintile4 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.57 -0.01 0.74 
  Quintile5 -0.22 0.00 -0.03 0.45 -0.03 0.53 
  Education -0.13 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.83 
  Family size -0.74 0.00 -0.33 0.01 -0.43 0.01 
  Comfort -0.34 0.00 -0.03 0.43 -0.02 0.56 
  Urban -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.02 0.53 
2015 Age70 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.71 0.02 0.60 
 chronic 0.01 0.67 -0.02 0.58 -0.01 0.97 
  Quintile1 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.28 
  Quintile2 0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.78 
  Quintile3 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.91 0.00 0.82 
  Quintile4 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.26 -0.01 0.72 
  Quintile5 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.78 -0.02 0.73 
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 Table 2.20 Differences within Groups Across Time after PSM 
 
Table 2.21 Differences within Groups Across Time after Four Grouping PSM  
  Control group Treatment 1 Control group Treatment 2 
Comfort 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2012 0.02 
   
0.01 
   
-0.03 
   
-0.02 







  2014 0.02 0.00 0.05 
 
0.05 0.04 0.08** 
 
0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
0.06** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 2015 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.06 0.10** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.09* 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.05** 
Chronic 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2012 -0.01 
   
0.00 
   
0.03 
   
0.03 







  2014 0.09** 0.11** 0.02 
 
0.07** 0.07* 0.01 
 
0.13*** 0.10** 0.05 
 
0.12*** 0.09*** 0.05 
 2015 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.09* 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.09** 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.03 -0.01 
  Control group Treatment 1 Control group Treatment 2 




















 0.00 0.00 
 
  
2014  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
  
 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
-0.01 0.00 -0.08*** 
  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
2015  0.14*** 0.16*** 0.12***  0.18***  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.03  0.03  0.00 0.01 0.0  0.00 




















 0.00 0.00 
 
  
2014  0.01 0.02 0.01 
  
 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
0.03 0.00 0.00 
  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
2015  -0.04  -0.05* -0.05  -0.09***  0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.01  0.00 -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  0.00 
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Table 2.22 Results for Treatment Group 1 (Financial Variables) 
*** Significance at 1 %.  ** Significance at 5% * Significance at 10%.    
  

























2011-2012 2337 0.00 0.12 2337 0.01 0.12 2337 -0.02 0.11 
2011-2013 2235 -0.04 0.14 2235 -0.05 0.11 2235 -0.05 0.10 




2013-2014 2233 0.02 0.15 2233 0.05 0.12 2233 0.04 0.10 




2011-2012 2337 -0.03 0.17 2337 -0.04 0.15 2337 -0.07 0.13 
2011-2013 2235 -0.07** 0.18 2235 -0.06 0.15 2235 -0.05 0.12 




2013-2014 2233 0.01 0.21 2233 0.03 0.16 2233 0.03 0.13 




2011-2012 2337 -5.87 0.07 2337 -1.43 0.10 2337 -8.69 0.10 
2011-2013 2235 -15.41 0.07 2235 -14.41 0.09 2235 -21.34 0.08 




2013-2014 2233 7.14 0.08 2233 -2.42 0.09 2233 2.74 0.08 




                Table 2.23 Results for Treatment Group 1 (Health Status and Utilization Variables) 
*** Significance at 1 %.  ** Significance at 5% * Significance at 10%. 
Results shows β3 coefficient from the regression below, which is the outcome of a DID.  For example, in 2011-2012, the DID with covariates method shows 
that there was a 1% increase in inpatient utilization of healthcare services. 
Y = β0 + β1T + β2S + β3(TxS) + β4X + ε 
  


























2011-2012 2337 -0.01 0.03 2337 -0.02 0.07 2337 -0.04 0.08 
2011-2013 2235 0.00 0.03 2235 -0.01 0.04 2235 -0.03 0.04 
2012-2013 2252 0.01 0.03 2252 0.01 0.06 2252 0.01 0.08 
UHC reform 
effect 
2013-2014 2233 -0.01 0.02 2233 0.00 0.04 2233 0.00 0.04 




2011-2012 2337 -0.01 0.01 2337 -0.03 0.02 2337 -0.05 0.02 
2011-2013 2235 0.03 0.01 2235 0.02 0.01 2235 0.02 0.01 
2012-2013 2252 0.04 0.01 2252 0.05 0.01 2252 0.07 0.01 
UHC reform 
effect 
2013-2014 2233 -0.02 0.02 2233 -0.02 0.03 2233 -0.02 0.02 




                Table 2.24 Results for Treatment Group 2 (Financial Variables) 
 
 
*** Significance at 1 %.  ** Significance at 5% * Significance at 10%.     
      





















Trend assumption 2011-2012 3461 -0.02 0.11 3461 -0.02 0.11 3461 -0.03 0.10 
EMAP reform 
effect 
2012-2013 3464 -0.08*** 0.11 3464 -0.05 0.10 3464 -0.03 0.09 
Joint effect of 
EMAP and UHC 
2012-2014 3528 -0.06** 0.10 3528 -0.03 0.09 3528 0.01 0.09 
2012-2015 3531 -0.06** 0.11 3531 -0.03 0.11 3531 0.01 0.10 
Cata30 
Trend assumption 2011-2012 3461 -0.02 0.13 3461 -0.04 0.13 3461 -0.06 0.12 
EMAP reform 
effect 
2012-2013 3464 -0.09*** 0.13 3464 -0.04 0.11 3464 -0.02 0.10 
Joint effect of 
EMAP and UHC 
2012-2014 3528 -0.08*** 0.13 3528 -0.04 0.12 3528 -0.02 0.11 
2012-2015 3531 -0.06* 0.12 3531 0.01 0.14 3531 0.02 0.12 
OOP 
Trend assumption 2011-2012 3461 -0.28 0.07 3461 -3.30 0.08 3461 -9.56 0.11 
EMAP reform 
effect 
2012-2013 3464 -3.71 0.08 3464 11.27 0.09 3464 20.55 0.09 
Joint effect of 
EMAP and UHC 
2012-2014 3528 -7.80 0.09 3528 -27.21 0.11 3528 -15.34 0.12 




                Table 2.25 Results for Treatment Group 2 (Health Status and Utilization Variables) 
 
























Trend assumption 2011-2012 3461 0.00 0.03 3461 -0.03 0.07 3461 -0.04 0.10 
EMAP reform 
effect 
2012-2013 3464 0.01 0.04 3464 0.04 0.06 3464 0.06* 0.07 
Joint effect of 
EMAP and UHC 
2012-2014 3528 0.02 0.04 3528 0.04 0.06 3528 0.05 0.07 
2012-2015 3531 0.02 0.04 3531 0.05* 0.07 3531 0.06* 0.09 
Outpatient 
Trend assumption 2011-2012 3461 -0.01 0.04 3461 -0.03 0.04 3461 -0.04 0.03 
EMAP reform 
effect 
2012-2013 3464 0.00 0.02 3464 0.05* 0.03 3464 0.07* 0.02 
Joint effect of 
EMAP and UHC 
2012-2014 3528 0.00 0.03 3528 0.00 0.04 3528 -0.01 0.05 
2012-2015 3531 -0.01 0.04 3531 0.00 0.04 3531 0.03 0.03 
 
*** Significance at 1 %.  ** Significance at 5% * Significance at 10%. 
Results shows β3 coefficient from the regression below, which is the outcome of a DID.  For example, in 2012-2015, the DID with PSM and covariates 
method shows that there was a 7% increase in inpatient utilization.  
Y = β0 + β1T + β2S + β3(TxS) + β4X + ε 
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Table 2.26 Descriptive Statistics for the Control and Treatment Group 2 in 2012-2013- Adjusted Using 







Table 2.27 Descriptive Statistics for the Control and Treatment Group 2 in 2012-2014- Adjusted Using 
the Four Grouping Propensity Score Method  
Dependent 
variables 
Control Group   Treatment Group 2 
2012 2014   2012 2014 
mean se mean se   mean se mean se 
cata40 0.26 0.02 0.21 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 
cata30 0.35 0.02 0.32 0.02 
 
0.23 0.01 0.18 0.01 
OOP_Health_Exp 83.68 7.64 108.25 16.53 
 
59.10 5.06 64.30 4.29 
Outpatient 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.02 
 
0.14 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Inpatient 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.01 
 
0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Table 2.28 Descriptive Statistics for the Control and Treatment Group 2 in 2012-2015- Adjusted Using 
the Four Grouping Propensity Score Method  
Dependent 
variables 
Control Group   Treatment Group 2 
2012 2015   2012 2015 
mean se mean se   mean se mean se 
cata40 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.16 0.01 
cata30 0.36 0.02 0.32 0.02 
 
0.23 0.01 0.23 0.01 
OOP_Health_Exp 84.29 7.71 113.62 29.87 
 
59.10 5.06 87.63 8.71 
Outpatient 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.02 
 
0.14 0.01 0.18 0.01 
Inpatient 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.01 
 




Control Group   Treatment Group 2 
2012 2013   2012 2013 
mean se mean  se   mean  se mean se 
cata40 0.26 0.02 0.27 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.14 0.01 
cata30 0.36 0.02 0.35 0.02 
 
0.23 0.01 0.21 0.01 
OOP_Health_Exp 84.00 7.67 80.81 7.84 
 
59.10 5.06 71.53 7.03 
Outpatient 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.02 
 
0.14 0.01 0.16 0.01 
Inpatient 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.01 
 
0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
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Table 2.29 Descriptive Statistics for the Control and Treatment Group 1 in 2013-2014- Adjusted Using 
the Four Grouping Propensity Score Method  
Dependent 
variables 
Control Group   Treatment Group 1 
2013 2015   2013 2015 
mean se mean se   mean se mean se 
cata40 0.25 0.02 0.18 0.02 
 
0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01 
cata30 0.31 0.02 0.25 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 
OOP_Health_Exp 66.89 6.97 80.31 14.23 
 
36.79 3.42 48.88 8.58 
Outpatient 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.02 
 
0.14 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Inpatient 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.01 
 
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 
Table 2.30 Descriptive Statistics for the Control and Treatment Group 1 in 2013-2015- Adjusted Using 




Control Group   Treatment Group 1 
2013 2015   2013 2015 
mean se mean se   mean se mean se 
cata40 0.25 0.02 0.18 0.02 
 
0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01 
cata30 0.31 0.02 0.25 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.11 0.01 
OOP_Health_Exp 66.89 6.97 80.31 14.23 
 
36.79 3.42 48.88 8.58 
Outpatient 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.02 
 
0.14 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Inpatient 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.01 
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Analyzing Incidences and Intensities of Out-of-




The main purpose of the present paper is to examine the incidences and intensities of 
catastrophic payments in both 2012 and 2015, through World Bank Methodology, as well as 
identify which constituent elements of out-of-pocket health expenditure produce households’ 
catastrophic health expenditures. By using the Integrated Household Survey Database of 
National Statistics Office of Georgia, the present study illustrates that medication costs a have 
significant share in a household’s health expenditure. Equally, medicine appears to be the 
chief cause of household catastrophic health expenditures. Specifically, 72% of CHEs are 
related to pharmaceutical spending.  
Furthermore, households with chronic diseases or disabled members spend 79% of their 
OOPHE on medicine, herewith the share of medication spending in OOP for the poor quintile 
is 84.7%, which is 16.1% more compared to the rich quintile. There is a similar situation for 
outpatient treatments, where the proportion of OOP pharmaceutical spending is 44% for 
outpatient treatments. In the case of poor household, this accounts for 57%, which is 21.3% 
greater than the rich quintile. An analyses of these incidences highlights that the poorest 
quintile group have catastrophic expenditures that amount to 16.6% in 2015, while it was 
13.2% in 2012. The fraction of money spent by households belonging to the aforesaid 
quintile does not experience significant changes. Accordingly, the present policy paper offers 
recommendations to whichever provision of prescription benefits packages for the poor shall 
be the primary policy objective for the government, in order to wholly protect households 




3.1. Introduction  
The first chapter of the dissertation aimed at identifying factors causing catastrophic 
health expenditures in Georgia, which revealed that, more so than other groups, the most 
vulnerable households of the population were suffering from catastrophic health 
expenditures. The first chapter discerned that outpatient treatments, as well as having 
chronically ill members within households, were the greatest and most widespread factors 
causing CHE. However, the aforementioned study was limited to understanding which 
elements of outpatient treatments were the leading factors (outpatient service costs, outpatient 
prescription costs, and other indirect costs, which can be associated with outpatient 
treatments) behind CHEs. Therefore, the present study is aimed at determining the constituent 
elements of outpatient treatments, as well as the service costs necessary for chronically ill 
members of a household. The results of the present study will have crucial importance for 
policy makers, since it will transmit significant information in order to demonstrate the areas 
where the healthcare budget should be directed in order to protect households from financial 
hardship.  
It is noteworthy that, since 2012, there has been no relevant research conducted in 
Georgia that has examined the composition of out-of-pocket health expenditure. However, 
the examination conducted by Gotsadze et al in 2009 indicated that: “the decrease of 
prevalence of catastrophic health expenditure is a policy objective of the government, which 
can be achieved by focusing on increased financial protection offered to the poor and 
expanding government financed benefits for the poor and chronically ill by including and 
expanding inpatient coverage and adding drug benefits.” Zoidze’s et al (2012) research also 
acknowledged that prescription costs were the main constituent element in the composition of 
OOPHE instigating CHE.  
In 2013, UHC was introduced in Georgia. An in-depth analyzes of the State 
Healthcare program for socially vulnerable and targeted groups (2009)6 and the Universal 
Healthcare Program (2013), demonstrate that there have been no significant changes, 
including related to pharmaceutical benefits. Since the introduction of UHC, there have been 
no improvements to prescription benefits, and there is a high probability that medicine related 
costs still create a significant share in the composition of OOPHE and represent a principal 
factor in households’ financial ruin. Therefore, this study will explore the proportion of 
                                                          
6 The healthcare program prior to the introduction of UHC. 
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medicinal spending in the composition of OOPHE and its dynamics within the set timeframe, 
2012-2015.  
The present research will use the World Bank Methodology, which helps to measure 
both incidences and intensity. In measuring incidences, the present study analyzes how the 
number of households which experienced CHE have changed during the timeframe, or how 
the number of households’ OOPHE have changed towards the given threshold. While 
measuring intensity, the present study identifies how the spending of households has adapted 
compared to the prescribed threshold both in 2012 and 2015.7 
The present paper asks following research questions: 1. How the number of 
households (incidences) experiencing CHE has changed after the launch of the UHC 
program? 2. How the share of OOP to non-food health expenditure (intensity) changed 
subsequent to the launch of UHC? 3. Which constituent elements of OOP cause households’ 
CHE? 
The results of this study include essential information for policy makers, as its 
examination contains the composition of catastrophic health expenditure within different 
quintile groups of the population. Therefore, the study reveals the highlighted necessities of 
the aforementioned groups. Furthermore, the information enables policy makers to develop 
health insurance packages commensurate with the necessities of different quintile groups. 
For instance, the necessities of the poor and rich quintile are dramatically disparate. 
Where the poor quintile has the need of state support for medication, the rich quintile may 
only require support for those expenses which exceed catastrophic health expenditure. 8 
Consequently, the same insurance package for everybody would be neither effective nor 
efficient at protecting the population from financial hardship.  
Furthermore, the present study will show a tangible illustration of the importance of 
similar research for other developed countries similar to Georgia. Such research would allow 
policy makers to establish and develop budget efficient healthcare programs initially based on 
the necessities of each distinguished group within a population.  
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the data specification 
and methodology. In particular, it describes the empirical method suggested by the World 
                                                          
7 The present study has chosen its timeframe, as it allows a comparison between the conditions of households 
before and after the introduction of the Universal Health Coverage program.  
8 The type of insurance package which only provides support for expenses exceeding CHE could be developed.  
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Bank. Section 3 presents the results of the research. While, section 4 discusses the policy 
implications and makes it conclusions.  
3.2. Data Definition and Methodology Specification  
In this study, we use the Integrated Household Survey Databases of the National 
Statistical Office of Georgia (from the fourth quarters of 2012 and 2015). The data includes 
average monthly expenditure, OOP, and the socio-economic characteristics of each 
household, such as age, gender, and education. The number of observations are 2784 and 
2746, from 2012 and 2015 respectively (Table 3.1). 
In the process of constructing the incidences and intensities, the present study used the 
Equivalent Size of the Household, which was created by the National Statistics Office of 
Georgia. This variable is calculated for each household, where the indicator is dependent on 
the sex and age of household members. There are six groups, based on sex and age. Each 
have corresponding weights: Children aged 0-7 with coefficient 0.64; Children aged 8-15 and 
Working age males (aged 16-64) with coefficient 1; Working age females (aged 16-59) with 
coefficient 0.84; Pension age males (aged 65 and more) with coefficient 0.88; and Pension 
age females (aged 60 and more) with coefficient 0.76. The corresponding coefficients are 
assigned to every household member and then calculated for each household.  
The number of equivalent adults with scale (cohabitation) effect is calculated for each 
household. The indicators are calculated on the base of 0.6 coefficients, where scale 
(cohabitation) effect denotes that expenditure of a single-person household is higher than 
expenditure of a two-person household, because certain outlays (rent of dwelling, utility 
payments, etc.) are jointly disbursed within a household. In the case of single member 
households, the indicator does not change and is equal to the number of equivalent adults. 
Whereas in all other cases, the indicator is equal to the number of the equivalent adults to the 
power of 0.6. In both 2012 and 2015, the household equivalent size equaled 1.9 (Table 3.1). 
In regard to health variables, the present study comprises households with chronically 
sick or disabled members. Households with a chronically ill or disabled member in the family 
represent the dummy variable which equals 1, otherwise it equates to 0. The data also 
includes utilization factors, such as inpatient and outpatient variables. To identify the 
utilization variables, the National Statistics Office of Georgia asked the following question: 
“did any member of the household use inpatient or outpatient services within the last 3 
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months? Inpatient and outpatient variables represent the dummy, which equals 1 if a 
household has used inpatient/outpatient service and otherwise it equals 0. 
The present study also constructs expenditure variables that measure both total 
expenditure and out-of-pocket health expenditure of a household. In 2012, the average total 
consumption of a household amounted to 676.6, GEL, while in 2015, it was 655.8 GEL. 
Though, OOPHE slightly decreased in 2015 and amounted to 59.1 GEL (Table 3.1).  
The data from the present study also provides information on prescription costs 
incurred from outpatient treatments, as well as necessary services utilized for chronic 
illnesses. Based on this evidence, the present study identifies the proportion of OOP 
outpatient drug expenditure to OOPHE. The share of pharmaceutical costs incurred were 
commonly identified between chronically ill members of household. The comparison of these 
two variables within the given timeframe will demonstrate the importance of medication 
benefits as part of the composition of OOPHE.  
To analyze the incidences and intensity of catastrophic health payments, the present 
study uses the World Bank Methodology, which O’Donnell et al. (2008) describes in 
Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data, the Guide to Techniques and Their 
Implementation. Health expenditure is regarded as catastrophic whenever the share of 
OOPHE is greater than 40% of household non-food expenditure. This research regards non-
food expenditure as a denominator, since it detects CHE better than using total expenditure. 
A potential problem related to the usage of total household expenditure is that the budget 
share may be lower for poor households. Poor households’ foremost costs are related to items 
essential for sustenance, such as food, leaving little to spend on healthcare. Therefore, poor 
households that cannot afford catastrophic payments are ignored. Thus, a solution is to define 
catastrophic payments not with respect to total expenditures, but in relation to non-food 
expenditures. 
According to the World Bank Methodology, an incidence of catastrophic payments is 
defined as the fraction of households whose share of healthcare costs into non-food 









where H is titled the headcount, which measures incidences of catastrophic health payments. 
While, N is the number of households and 𝐸𝑖 is an indicator which equals 1 if the OOP of 
non-food expenditure exceeds the given thresholds (Z is the threshold) otherwise it equals 0.  
𝐸𝑖 = {




0   𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
This study will measure headcounts using five different thresholds: 10%, 15%, 25%, 
30% and 40%. For instance, in the case of a 40% threshold, the headcount measures the 
fraction of households which spend more than 40% of non-food expenditure on healthcare 
costs.  
The comparison of headcounts towards the given thresholds in 2012 and 2015 will 
provide an opportunity to gauge how the number of households change during the given 
timeframe in the different quintile groups.  
The expenditure quintile groups were defined through raking household monthly 
expenditure per adult equivalent by dividing household monthly expenditure with equivalent 
household size.  
As mentioned, the headcount measures incidences of catastrophic payments, but it 
does not reflect the amount by which households exceed the given threshold. While 
incidences of catastrophic payments measured by overshoot, captures the average degree by 
which payments (as a proportion of non-food expenditure) exceeds the threshold Z. This is 













Similar to incidence, in the case of the headcount, 𝐸𝑖 is indicator which equals 1 if the 
OOP share of non-food expenditure exceeds the given thresholds, otherwise it equals 0. 
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For example, in the case of the 40% threshold, then overshoot shows the average 
amount of money spent by households which exceeds the given threshold. To summarize, 
headcount captures only the incidences of anything catastrophic occurring, while overshoot 
captures the intensity of the occurrence. It is also noteworthy to mention the limitation of 
measuring incidences and intensities of catastrophic payments. The measurement of the 
incidences and intensity of catastrophic payments is insensitive to the distribution of 
catastrophic payments, as in the headcount all households exceeding the threshold are 
counted equally, while overshoot captures all money spent on healthcare in excess of the 
threshold, irrespective of whether they are made by the poor or the rich.  
For example, if there is a diminishing marginal utility of income, the opportunity cost 
of health spending by the poor will be greater than that by the rich. While placing a social 
welfare interpretation on measures of catastrophic payments, it might be argued that they 
should be weighted to reflect the differential opportunity cost. In accordance to the World 
Bank Methodology, the distribution of catastrophic payments in relation to income could be 
measured by concentration indices (O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
For example, in the case of the 40% threshold, the headcount equals 15% and 
signifies that 15% of households spend more than 40% of their non-food expenditure on 
healthcare, while this does not provide information on the type of households they are, poor 
or rich: which is the very reason the World Bank Methodology offers the opportunity to 
measure the concentration index, and the same is true for overshoot.  
Two forms of concentration index exist, one for intensity, 𝐶𝑂 , and another for 
incidence, 𝐶𝐸. When 𝐶𝐸 is positive, it means that there is greater tendency for the better-off to 
exceed the given payment threshold. There is a similar interpretation is with 𝐶𝑂. One way of 
adjusting the headcount and overshoot measures of catastrophic payments, to take into 
account the distribution of the payments, is to multiply each measurement by the complement 
of the respective concentration index (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003): 
𝐻𝑊 = 𝐻(1 − 𝐶𝐸) 
and- 
𝑂𝑊 = 𝑂(1 − 𝐶𝑂) 
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In particular, the weight of 𝐻𝑊 equals 2 if a household represents the lowest group 
and the weight declines linearly with income distribution, consequently the richest household 
receives 0.  
The same is true in relation to 𝑂𝑊. If those who exceed the catastrophic payments 
threshold are poorer, the concentration index 𝐶𝐸  will be negative, and this will make 
𝐻𝑊greater than H. 
The comparison of data of both 2012 and 2015 will provide the opportunity to see 
tendency dynamics of incidences and intensities within the given time.  
This research is aimed at determining the significance of prescription costs in the 
incidences of households’ catastrophic health expenditure. Therefore, the study has 
constructed a variable OOP medication spending share of non-food expenditure.  
3.3. Results and Discussion 
With the help of incidence patterns, this work examines how the number of 
households experiencing CHE have changed since the Georgian government has introduced 
the UHC program. Additionally, through the study of intensity, the study explores the range 
of CHE within the given timeframe. The results demonstrated that the condition of 
households in relation to CHE has not changed since the launch of the UHC program, and 
CHE still represents a significant challenge on the path to protecting the population from 
financial ruin.  
For the present study, health expenditure is deemed catastrophic when the OOP 
divided by non-food expenditure is greater than 40%. The necessary calculations have 
revealed that, within 2012-2015, the number of households facing catastrophic health 
expenditures increased from 12.1% to 13.5%. Whereas, the fraction of money spent in cases 
of CHE decreased from 59% to 55.8%, which highlights that more households face CHE, 
even though the amount of money spent on healthcare is less than in 2015 (Table 3.2). Such a 
comparison does not provide the opportunity to analyze the condition of different quintile 
groups. Therefore, the present study observes dynamics of the incidences and intensities in 
different quintile groups.  
In the case of the poorest quintile group, catastrophic expenditures accounted for 
16.6% in 2015, while they amounted to 13.2% in 2012. The fraction of money spent by 
70 
 
households belonging to this quintile does not experience statistically significant changes. 
This demonstrates that following the implementation of UHC in 2013, OOP catastrophic 
health expenditures of poor households remain unchanged. Furthermore, the number of 
households facing catastrophic health expenditures increased in 2015 compared to 2012 
(Table 3.2).  
Whilst in the rich quintile, the number of households facing CHE saw no change in 
2012-2015, and amounted to 11%. However, the share of OOP to non-food expenditure, for 
the given 40% threshold, diminished by 8.4% and accounted for 57.2% in 2015 (Table 3.2). 
A similar situation is seen in relation to the fourth quintile. Therefore, according to the 
available data, it is obvious that the economic condition of the rich quintile improved over 
that of the poor quintile (2012-2015).9  
In 2009, Georgia introduced a state insurance program, covering the socially 
vulnerable part of the population: including children aged 0-6, students, pensioners and 
people with disabilities. While research conducted by Gotsadze et al. in 2009, and by Zoidze 
et al. in 2012, initiated recommendations to enhance insurance packages for these groups, 
including support for medication, the government, in 2013, took the decision to implement 
UHC. The data analyzed within this study raises questions in relation to the efficiency of the 
UHC program, as it ought to be aimed at assisting the condition of the most impoverished 
parts of society. The aforementioned results might be explained by the decision of the 
Georgian government, in 2013, to insure the entire population, regardless of their socio-
economic condition. As UHC failed to compromise on improvements to insurance packages 
for the poor, this could be considered a source for the poor quintile still facing financial 
hardship.  
As described in the methodology section, headcount and overshoot demonstrates how 
the number of households facing catastrophic health expenditures have increased during the 
timeframe, as well as adjustments to the fraction of money when households incur CHE. 
However, headcount and overshoot do not provide information concerning the socio-
economic conditions of households facing CHE. For that reason, in the second part of the 
discussion, the research will consider concentration indexes.  
                                                          
9 Figure 3.1 illustrates the results reflected in Table 3.3. 
 The blue line highlights the year 2015, while red line displays the records of 2012.  
71 
 
Table 3.3 illustrates the changes of concentration indexes in 2012-2015. Thus, one 
can discern that the 40% threshold headcount concentration index is negative, denoting that 
the worse-off are more likely to incur catastrophic health expenditures, both in 2012 and in 
2015. Consequently, it is apparent that the ranked weighted headcount is greater than the 
headcount. The concentration index is also negative against every threshold, not only in case 
of 40%. This signifies that the prescribed threshold of the worse-off is more likely to exceed 
the threshold than the better-off.  
The study reveals that the situation is slightly different concerning the overshoot 
concentration index. In 2012, the overshoot concentration index was positive, whereas in 
2015, for the 40% threshold, it appears to be negative. This reveals that in 2012, overshoot 
tends to be greater among the better-off, while in 2015, overshoot tends to be greater among 
the worse-off. The situation also appears to be the same in cases of the 25% and 30% 
thresholds.  
To summarize, in both 2012 and 2015, poor households were more likely to incur 
catastrophic health expenditures. Therefore, the financial hardship of this section of the 
population still represents a challenge for the government, even after the launch of the UHC 
program. Accordingly, the determination of expenses that led households to financial ruin 
(when CHE occurred) ought to be a critical objective for policy makers.  
Table 3.4 illustrates composition of OOP, and it reveals that households with chronic 
diseases or disabled member in the family spend 79% of their OOP on medication. Whereas, 
the share of OOP for pharmaceuticals for the poor quintile is 84.7%, which is 16.1% greater 
than the rich quintile. The situation is similar in the case of outpatient treatments. The 
proportion of OOP prescription spending is 44% for outpatient treatments. Particularly 
noteworthy is the share of poor households, which account for 57%, a remarkable 21.3 % 
more compared to the rich quintile. As revealed in Table 3.4, prescription costs comprise a 
large share of out-of-pocket health expenditures, furthermore, such costs appear to be the 
main reason behind households’ catastrophic health expenditures. Table 3.5.2 illustrates that, 
in 2015, 13.53% of households faced CHE, where Table 3.5.1 identifies that 9.8% of those 
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expenses (CHE) are related to medication.10 These results illustrate that around 72% of CHE 
is related to spending on medicine.  
The data reveals that pharmaceutical costs have the largest share in OOPHE, as well 
as other expenses related to medication, both of which represent the main factors generating 
CHE. Consequently, based on the information revealed, the introduction of medication 
benefits ought to be the principal policy objective for the government, in order to develop 
efficient healthcare packages and assist households close to financial ruin 
3.4. Conclusion and Policy Implication  
Even within the limited number of research projects examining Georgia’s healthcare 
system and the governmental reforms, it has been acknowledged that improvements to health 
packages for the most vulnerable part of the population should become the primary policy 
objective for policy makers. Gotsadze et al. (2009) indicated that: “the decrease of prevalence 
of catastrophic health expenditure is a policy objective of the government, which can be 
achieved by focusing on increased financial protection offered to poor and expanding 
government financed benefits for the poor and chronically ill by including and expanding 
inpatient coverage and adding drug benefits.” Zoidze’s et al. (2012) research also 
acknowledged that medicine costs were the main constituent element of OOP, which 
subsequently cause CHE.  
The policy recommendations were clearly indicating direct budget funds be 
distributed to those of the population in the most need. Nevertheless, the Georgian 
government introduced the UHC program in 2013, which covers the entire population, 
regardless of the socio-economic conditions of households. Since healthcare reforms did not 
include any significant changes for insurance packages for the poor, this study has revealed 
that even after the introduction of UHC, the most vulnerable part of the population still 
experiences financial ruination.  
Although, it is clear that the most vulnerable part of the population has suffered the 
most from CHE, there has been no relevant research to provide a clear assessment of the 
composition of catastrophic health expenditures. This study therefore aimed to fill the request 
need. Analyzing the composition of CHE revealed that pharmaceutical costs are a significant 
                                                          
10 The present study constructed a variable for Table 3.5.1. OOP prescription spending divided by 




element of out-of-pocket health expenditure, in addition, medicine appears to be main cause 
of household catastrophic health expenditure: notably, 72% of CHE is related to prescription 
spending (Table 3.4). 
Hence, as medication costs still comprise a prominent share in CHE, the present 
policy paper recommends whichever provision of prescription benefits in healthcare packages 
are to be the key policy objective for the government, in order to fully protect households 



























































Cumulative proportion of households ranked by decreasing health payments 
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Figure 3.1: Health Payment Shares 
2015
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Year  N mean 
2015  
  Household size 2746 1.9 
Total consumption 2746 677.6 
Non-food consumption 2746 350.5 
Out-of-pocket 2746 55.4 
      
2012      
Household size 2784 1.9 
Total consumption 2784 655.8 
Non-food consumption 2784 342.7 
Out-of-pocket 2784 59.1 
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Table 3.2 Incidence and Intensity of Catastrophic Health Payments, Using Non-food   
                  10% 15% 25% 30% 40% 






































































































               Lowest Quintile 0.570 0.511 0.059** 0.493 0.395 0.098* 0.351 0.267 0.084* 0.288 0,211 0.077* 0.166 0.132 0.034*** 










2 0.572 0.467 0.106* 0.483 0.392 0.091* 0.290 0.262 0.027 0.223 0,207 0.016 0.128 0.136 -0.008 










3 0.522 0.476 0.046 0.427 0.379 0.049*** 0.268 0.217 0.051** 0.218 0,190 0.028 0.146 0.102 0.044** 










4 0.480 0.465 0.015 0.382 0.366 0.016 0.251 0.245 0.006 0.198 0,200 -0.002 0.127 0.118 0.009 










Highest Quintile 0.381 0.346 0.035 0.291 0.272 0.019 0.193 0.189 0.004 0.161 0,158 0.004 0.110 0.117 -0.007 










                Total 0.505 0.453 0.052* 0.415 0.361 0.054* 0.270 0.236 0.034* 0.217 0,193 0.0241** 0.135 0.121 0.014*** 
Std. Dev 0.500 0.498   0.492 0.481   0.444 0.425   0.413 0,395   0.342 0.326   
Average OOP                                
Lowest Quintile 0.336 0.304 0.033** 0.369 0.357 0.013 0.440 0.433 0.007 0.476 0.477 -0.001 0.570 0.556 0.015 










2 0.299 0.321 -0.022*** 0.332 0.360 -0.027** 0.423 0.440 -0.017 0.4663 0.4838 -0.018 0.551 0.557 -0.007 










3 0.309 0.300 0.010 0.351 0.344 0.007 0.442 0.455 -0.013 0.4806 0.4815 -0.001 0.545 0.604 -0.059* 










4 0.309 0.313 -0.004 0.355 0.364 -0.010 0.437 0.449 -0.012 0.4813 0.4881 -0.007 0.553 0.591 -0.038** 










Highest Quintile 0.313 0.361 -0.047** 0.374 0.426 -0.052** 0.466 0.529 -0.0631** 0.5032 0.5782 -0.075 0.572 0.656 -0.084* 





















Total 0.314 0.317 -0.003 0.355 0.366 -0.012 0.440 0.457 -0.017** 0.480 0.498 -0.018** 0.558 0.590 -0.032* 
Std. Dev 0.175 0.194   0.166 0.187   0.146 0.172   0.135 0.164   0.112 0.140   
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Table 3.3 Distribution-sensitive Catastrophic Payments Measures, Using Non-food 
    
   10% 15% 25% 30% 40% 
  2015 2012 2015 2012 2015 2012 2015 2012 2015 2012 
Concentration index, C_E -0.075 -0.059 -0.102 -0.062 -0.109 -0.064 -0.104 -0.056 -0.071 -0.038 
Standard error 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Rank-weighted headcount, 
H_W 
54.324 48.060 45.778 38.387 29.973 25.135 24.003 20.425 14.499 12.557 
Standard error 1.27 1.22 1.27 1.18 1.16 1.04 1.08 0.95 0.85 0.77 
Headcount (H) 50.5 45.4 41.5 36.1 27.0 23.6 21.7 19.3 13.5 12.1 
Standard error 1.13 1.07 1.10 1.02 0.97 0.89 0.90 0.82 0.72 0.65 
Concentration index, C_O -0.093 -0.028 -0.095 -0.020 -0.087 0.009 -0.080 0.027 -0.075 0.075 
Standard error 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Rank-weighted overshoot, 
O_W 
11.800 10.115 9.313 7.971 5.578 4.843 4.229 3.721 2.301 2.127 
Standard error 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.16 
                      Overshoot (O) 10.8 9.8 8.5 7.8 5.1 4.9 3.9 3.8 2.1 2.3 
Standard error 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.16 
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Table 3.4 Compositions of Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure  
 
  Outpatient, Inpatient and Chronic 
Treatment Medicinal share on 
OOP  
Poor 2 3 4 Richest Total 













Headcount (H) – 2015 0.570 0.380 0.454 0.344 0.429 0.360 0.438 0.359 0.373 0.357 0.444 0.364 
Headcount (H) – 2012 0.555 0.419 0.518 0.370 0.484 0.387 0.489 0.369 0.403 0.364 0.487 0.383 













Headcount (H) - 2015 0.847 0.265 0.817 0.271 0.804 0.283 0.786 0.304 0.686 0.364 0.790 0.301 
Headcount (H) - 2012 0.818 0.314 0.815 0.303 0.784 0.312 0.701 0.340 0.649 0.398 0.756 0.339 
 
Table 3.5 Out-of-Pocket Pharmaceutical Spending as a Share of Non-food and Out-of-Pocket Share of Non-food 
 
Table 3.5.1 Out-of-Pocket Pharmaceutical Spending as a 
Share of Non-food  
Table 3.5.2: Out-of-Pocket Share of Non-Food 
 
      
Threshold budget share morer than 40% 
 
Threshold budget share more than 40% 
Out-of-pocket pharmaceutical 
spending as a share of non-food 
40%> 
 










Headcount (H) - 2015 0,098 0,297 
 
Headcount (H) – 2015 0,1353 0,3421 
Headcount (H) - 2012 0,070 0,255 
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